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Intent, Inequality, and the Berlin Walls of
the Mind
Bobby L. Dexter*

Abstract
Although acknowledging that various provisions in the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act of 2017 appear responsive to normative arguments presented in tax
literature, this article posits that, true to its core intent, the law aggressively
advanced the persistent effort to shift the tax burden away from the nation’s
wealthiest citizens to the great bulk of taxpayers of more modest financial
means. Thus, those with political power successfully employed the tax law to
protect, preserve, and enhance prevailing wealth and income
inequality. With the election of President Joe Biden and the assumption of
Democratic control in both chambers of Congress, however, we now have the
opportunity to repeal or modify a number of the TCJA’s provisions. Beyond
suggesting specific short-term measures regarding tax rates, this article
proposes a multi-faceted, long-term investment in education. Those
completing higher education generally enjoy greater financial stability (and
the enhanced ability to build and transfer wealth across
generations). Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the higher education
experience facilitates exposure to those who are different, enables the
conscious dismantling of prejudices, frustrates the confirmation of long-held
biases, and thereby weakens those intangible, ignorance-rooted elements that
have also played key roles in creating and perpetuating economic and a host
of other inequalities. Given the burgeoning and burdensome cost of higher
education, the article highlights the need to augment targeted tax

* Professor of Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. I’d like to extend my
sincere thanks to the many tax scholars who provided helpful comments with respect to earlier versions
of this article. Let me also thank and commend the members of the Pepperdine Law Review for their
outstanding editorial work and research assistance. I’m also happy to acknowledge Chapman
University’s financial support with respect to the production of this scholarship.
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expenditures to support student debtors, especially those who are unable to
reap the tax benefits of homeownership or maximize retirement savings in the
near term.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

While we typically think of the rule of law as being designed to
protect the weak against the strong, and ordinary citizens against the
privileged, those with wealth will use their political power to shape
the rule of law to provide a framework within which they can exploit
others. They will use their political power, too, to ensure the
preservation of inequalities rather than the attainment of a more
egalitarian and more just economy and society.
—Joseph E. Stiglitz1
With the convergence of a Republican President and Republican
majorities in both chambers of Congress, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)
became law in December of 2017.2 To its credit, the legislation appears, at
least in many of its provisions, responsive to a host of normative arguments
presented by tax scholars and economists over time. Among other topics,
commentary concerning progressive tax rates, the mortgage interest
deduction, corporate taxes, the alternative minimum tax, and the deduction for
payment of state and local taxes has been quite robust. Indeed, many policy
advocates cheer the law’s enactment and likely remain inclined to sanction
more of the same. They may be in for a decidedly uncomfortable wait. In the
wake of a host of Democratic victories in recent national elections, resulting
in both a Democratic President and Democratic control of both chambers of
Congress, much accomplished in the TCJA may face prompt dismantling (and
with good reason). Notwithstanding the law’s apparent and occasional merits,
it remains critically necessary to consider both the intent behind and the
ramifications flowing from the law’s enactment. Moreover, viewing the
legislation as a powerful vehicle capable of implementing much-needed
changes in the tax law, it is equally necessary to consider both what the
legislation introduced or changed as well as what it, rather stubbornly,
managed to leave in place.3 With clear and specific intent, the new law
1. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 190–91 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2012) (citation
omitted); see also K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion Through the
Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2476–77 (2018) (pointing out that legal
regimes were central in constructing prevailing systemic inequality).
2. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2051.
3. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 28 (“Much of the inequality that exists today is a result of
government policy, both what the government does and what it does not do. Government has the
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aggressively exacerbates existing income and wealth inequality by shifting
even more of the tax burden away from the well-tailored back pockets of the
rich and onto the yokes of salaried white-collar professionals and the heavyladen backs of blue-collar working men and women. Far more than a mere
partisan achievement, the legislation works hand in glove with the unchecked
market forces that almost invariably give rise to inequality and reflects the
work of a Congress largely captured4 by politically-influential monied
interests5 and thus dominated by those willing to take bold steps to preserve
systemic inequality.6 It is a national victory for the so-called 1% at the top of
the income and wealth distribution in their ongoing and generally fruitful
quest to reap all the benefits of American capitalism largely at the expense of
the 99%.7 And this most recent triumph of burden-shifting is merely one in a
series. With the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Tax Reform Act),8
Congress lowered individual tax rates, largely benefitting those at the top of
the progressive rate structure. Others were forced to finance these rate cuts
by various means such as suffering, for example, the elimination of the

power to move money from the top to the bottom and the middle, or vice versa.”).
4. Cf. id. at 47–48 (discussing regulatory capture and cognitive capture). See id. at 161
(“Persuading politicians to adopt one’s perspectives and perceptions has a double advantage: not only
do they sell the ideas to the public; they translate the ideas into legislation and regulation.”).
5. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 661 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2017) (“Has the US political process been captured by
the 1 percent? This idea has become increasingly popular among observers of the Washington political
scene.”) (citation omitted). There may well be no need for “capture.” Self-interest may be at play.
See id. at 662 (noting that U.S. politicians appear to be much wealthier than their European
counterparts and in a category notably different relative to the average American citizen). The 27th
Amendment to the Constitution restricts Congress’s ability to alter congressional salaries, but can it
not accomplish the same thing, in effect, by lowering its own taxes? U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
6. See PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 662 (“The experience of France in the Belle Époque proves . . .
that no hypocrisy is too great when economic and financial elites are obliged to defend their interests—
and that includes economists, who currently occupy an enviable place in the US income hierarchy.”)
(citation omitted).
7. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at xxi (emphasizing that often, those at the top enjoying financial
rewards do not necessarily create jobs and may use their financial wherewithal to distort the political
process to their benefit). Stiglitz also goes on to emphasize that political systems dominated by the
wealthy facilitate the design of legal, regulatory, and administrative regimes that “not only fail to
protect the ordinary citizens against the wealthy but also further enrich the wealthy at the expense of
the rest of society.” Id. at xix. He later re-emphasizes the point, noting that “[e]very law, every
regulation, every institutional arrangement has distributive consequences—and the way we have been
shaping America’s market economy works to the advantage of those at the top and to the disadvantage
of the rest.” Id. at 52–53.
8. I.R.C. §§ 1–1400.
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deduction for personal interest,9 although Congress did opt to spare some
long-treasured allowances (e.g., the deduction with respect to qualified
residence interest).10 In the years after the enactment of the Tax Reform Act,
individual and other tax rates were pushed down further or temporarily
increased, depending on prevailing political sentiment, but tax provisions
favoring the wealthy managed to persist.11 The TCJA did not alter the
favorable treatment of long-term capital gains12 or qualified dividend
income,13 and it left in place the favorable treatment of investment interest,14
the dismal treatment of student loan interest,15 and the longstanding favor of

9. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (2012).
10. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2012).
11. TAX POLICY CTR., Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, (Aug. 2, 2019),
taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-individual-income-tax-parameters
(documenting
the
fluctuation of tax rates for low- and high-income brackets over time).
12. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 71 (noting that “[t]he most egregious aspect of recent tax policy
was the lowering of tax rates on capital gains . . . . In this way we have given the very rich, who
receive a large fraction of their income in capital gains, close to a free ride.”). Other commentators
have lamented the favorable tax treatment accorded long-term capital gains. See ANDREA FLYNN ET
AL., THE HIDDEN RULES OF RACE: BARRIERS TO AN INCLUSIVE ECONOMY 73–74 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2017) (arguing that racial wealth inequality is heavily affected by tax law favoring asset holding
over income earned).
13. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 71 (noting that the tax cuts ushered in during the presidency of
George W. Bush benefitted the very rich by lowering rates on qualified dividends and capital gains
and gradually eliminating the estate tax). Stiglitz goes on to note that such tax cuts did not yield
expected benefits. See id. at 71, 211 (emphasizing that tax cuts for the wealthy and rich (capital gains
and dividends) did not lead to increases in investment and sustainable growth); see also id. at 221
(noting that cutting taxes on the wealthy via embracing supply-side economics has not resulted in
increased economic activity).
14. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(B) (2012).
15. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(F) (2012); see also I.R.C. § 221(b) (2012) (promptly phasing out the
deduction with respect to student loan interest). Like other forms of interest, student loan interest was
deductible prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See Jacqueline T. Albus, Comment, The Deduction
for Interest on Student Loans: Relief is on the Way, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 591, 591 (1998). Although
student loan interest was rendered non-deductible as “personal interest” by the Tax Reform Act, the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 restored the deductibility of student loan interest to some extent. See id.
Notwithstanding Congress’s acknowledgment that many students incur substantial debt in obtaining
college and graduate education, the rapid phase-out of the student loan interest deduction effectively
undermines the policy objectives supporting enactment. See id. The rapid phase-out results in the
student loan interest deduction primarily benefitting lower-income taxpayers. See JOINT COMMITTEE
ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018–2022 at 38
(2018) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE ESTIMATES] (estimating that the student loan interest deduction
will benefit those in the $40,000–$50,000 income class more than it will benefit those in the $200,000
and Over income class).
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real estate industry interests.16 In addition to lowering progressive tax rates
applicable to individuals,17 the new law also lowered the tax rates on
corporations as well as specific non-corporate businesses (via the deduction
for qualified business income).18 And notwithstanding the fact that the
deduction for personal exemptions has been especially valuable to large and
growing families for decades, Congress chose to reduce the exemption
amount to $0.19 There’s more. Those with deductions sufficient to justify
itemizing (1) must contend with a new and hard ceiling with respect to
deductions for the payment of state and local income and property taxes, and
(2) may be forced to contend with the impact of reduced debt ceilings with
respect to the deduction of qualified residence interest.20
Faithful to its originating intent, the TCJA aggressively advances the
ongoing burden-shifting offensive. The legislation has many beneficiaries of
Congress’s legislative grace, and yet we have no guarantee that the fortunate
individuals and businesses will go on to generate positive societal
externalities.21 Without question, unfortunately, those outside the favored
class must shoulder more and more of the burden of Congress’s largesse,22
16. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(4) (2012). Although all miscellaneous itemized deductions have been
suspended, the deductions taken in arriving at adjusted gross income do not constitute “itemized
deductions.” See I.R.C. §§ 63(d)(1), 67(g) (2012). Specific deductions “attributable to property held
for the production of rents” are taken into account in arriving at adjusted gross income. I.R.C. §
62(a)(4); see also STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 239–40 (noting that those controlling the political process
will use their power to influence the creation of economic systems that favor them and pointing out
that industry-specific measures are one means).
17. See PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 662. The persistent attempt to push progressive tax rates lower
and lower is troubling. Id. Piketty notes that “the history of the progressive tax over the course of the
twentieth century suggests that the risk of a drift towards oligarchy is real and gives little reason for
optimism about where the United States is headed.” Id.
18. Tax Cuts and Job Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 199A, 131 Stat. 2054, 2063 (2017)
(allowing a 20% deduction for qualified business income).
19. See I.R.C. § 151(d)(5)(A) (2012).
20. See I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(3)(F)(i)(II), 164(b)(6) (2012).
21. See Lily L. Batchelder, et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006) (noting that most tax incentives take the form of deductions
or exclusions (resulting in those with higher marginal tax rates enjoying a larger tax preference) and
arguing that providing a larger tax incentive to those with higher marginal tax rates is economically
inefficient unless such beneficiaries generate more positive societal externalities or are more
responsive to the incentive); see also PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 656 (concluding that substantial
reduction in the top marginal tax rates in the early 1980s did not stimulate productivity, at least not to
any statistically measurable extent).
22. The same balancing was seen with respect to the Tax Reform Act. See Kenneth Allen Jewell,
Note, The Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act of 1988: Beyond the Informed Use of Credit,
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enhancing the likelihood that economic inequality will not only persist in the
near term but also worsen in the future.
In Part II of this Article, I discuss several of the root causes of economic
inequality as well as the mechanisms employed to ensure its perpetuation.
Addressing the critical role played by tax laws and policies, I provide a brief
survey of many of the changes introduced by the TCJA. Given the
significance of homeownership in terms of wealth-building and
intergenerational wealth transfer, I devote focused attention to the historical
and current treatment of mortgage interest.23 Parts III and IV present shortterm and long-term measures directed at alleviating economic inequality, with
the latter highlighting the importance of higher education, and Part V proceeds
to discuss the urgent need to intervene at various stages of the educational
process to ensure access to educational opportunity and to stymie the
economic and non-economic inequalities that have given rise to burgeoning
social unrest. In Part VI, I comment briefly on President Biden’s near-term
tax policy goals while setting forth my concluding thoughts.

2 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 351, 353 (1990) (noting how the anticipated revenue loss resulting from the
lowering of marginal tax rates by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 prompted the contemporaneous
elimination or phaseout of several deductions and items of tax preference).
23. See infra Sections II.B.4.b, II.B.4.c.
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II. THE EXISTENCE AND PERPETUATION OF INCOME AND WEALTH
INEQUALITY
A. The Causes of Economic and Other Inequalities
The level of wealth inequality in the United States has grown steadily
over the years, and according to at least one recent commentator, the economic
disparity has reached a level not seen in almost a century.24 Although no one
factor dominates as the root cause of inequality,25 it merits emphasizing,
whether one focuses on income26 inequality or the wealth27 inequality that it
often begets, that neither chronic nor burgeoning inequality is natural but is a
product of government policies.28 Although one can justifiably point to
deregulation of the financial sector and progressive tax policy changes as
significant historical contributors,29 commentators have noted the impact of
factors as divergent as adverse U.S. Supreme Court decisions,30 globalization
24. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Millennials, Affordable Housing, and the Future of
Homeownership, 24 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 435, 450 (2016) (noting that wealth
inequality has grown to levels not seen since the Gilded Age of the 1920s).
25. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at xxiv (noting that various intertwined factors contribute to
existing inequality).
26. See Palma J. Strand, Education-as-Inheritance Crowds Out Education-as-Opportunity, 59 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 283, 286 (2015) (“Income represents resources that arrive over time, frequently in the
form of earnings.”).
27. Id. Delineating income and wealth, one commentator noted the following:
Unspent and saved income . . . gives rise to wealth. Wealth represents amassed resources
that may generate income and that, importantly, provide an economic cushion to meet
unexpected contingencies such as sickness or lost employment or a reserve to cover
anticipated major expenditures such as college education or the purchase of a home.
Id. (citation omitted). It has been argued that wealth disparities merit primary and preliminary focus
in addressing economic inequality. See FLYNN ET AL., supra note 12, at 64 (noting policy discussion
focused on closing education and income gaps as a means of addressing economic and racial inequality
and emphasizing the preliminary need to address wealth disparities (in which other forms of inequality
are rooted)).
28. See Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court Contributes to
Economic Inequality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 389, 397 (2014).
29. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY xxxi (preface) (paperback ed. 2013)
(reasoning that deregulation of the financial sector and reduction in progressive tax rates during the
presidency of Ronald Reagan was a pivotal moment in terms of widening inequality in the United
States).
30. See Gilman, supra note 28, at 393 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court sometimes renders
decisions harmful to the economic interests of the 99% and impedes legislative efforts to remedy the
situation). Gilman notes that “[w]hile a popular conception of the Court is that it is designed to protect
vulnerable minorities at the hands of majoritarian impulse, the Court, instead, is helping to protect a
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and the mobility of capital,31 deficits in the educational system,32 and
intergenerational transfers of accumulated wealth at death (with minimal or
no tax consequence in most instances).33 In fact, various intergenerational
inter vivos transfers of wealth (including down payments on homes and fullyfunded college educations)34 have been identified as contributing factors.35
Interestingly enough, the transfer may go well beyond mere college funding.
The recent Varsity Blues scandal (in which several famous and wealthy
individuals were arrested and criminally charged36 for using bribes to
fraudulently secure the admission of their children to colleges and
universities) highlights the extent to which the wealthy will go; they manage
to transfer wealth by fully funding a college education, and they are willing to
break the law to ensure that they have the ability to effect the transfer at the
right college. The scandal itself causes one to ponder not only how long such
transgressions have being operating behind the scenes but also how many took
advantage of the scheme and escaped without exposure or punishment. And,
by the way, although there may be those who face real and meaningful
punishment for their role in the Varsity Blues fraud scheme, sentences for
those apparently complying with prosecutors (to some extent at least) have
thus far been remarkably light.37 This end result should come as no surprise.
very powerful minority at the expense of the majority.” Id.
31. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 62 (pointing out that the high mobility of capital ultimately
forces workers to accept lower wages and less desirable working conditions).
32. See Gilman, supra note 28, at 392 (identifying deficits in the educational system as one of
several factors identified by economists as contributing to rising inequality).
33. See FLYNN ET AL., supra note 12, at 74 (identifying the receipt of appreciated property via
inheritance (and taking it with a stepped-up basis) as a driver of racial wealth inequality).
34. See Strand, supra note 26, at 287–88 (noting that education is not always identified or
quantified as a wealth transfer and emphasizing the importance of taking a more holistic view of wealth
transfer).
35. See FLYNN ET AL., supra note 12, at 67 (discussing research that concluded racial wealth
disparities—rather than being rooted in education, income, and employment disparities—flow largely
from intergenerational transfers such as down payments on homes, fully-funded college education,
and parental bequests); see also Strand, supra note 26, at 286 (discussing Langbein’s argument
regarding the intergenerational transfer of wealth inter vivos via human capital investment (primarily
through the financing of education)).
36. See generally U.S. Att’y Office, Dist. of Mass., Arrests Made in Nationwide College
Admissions Scam: Alleged Exam Cheating & Athletic Recruitment Scheme, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar.
12, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/arrests-made-nationwide-college-admissions-scamalleged-exam-cheating-athletic (discussing relevant arrests).
37. See Steve Helling, Lori Loughlin Reports to Prison: ‘She Hopes to be Home by Christmas,’
PEOPLE (Oct. 30, 2020), https://people.com/crime/lori-loughlin-reports-to-prison-she-hopes-to-beout-by-christmas/ (indicating that for her role in the crimes, Lori Loughlin has been sentenced to two
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The palpably inconvenient reality is that different rules and standards have
long been applied to different groups of people. Inevitably, social forces like
discrimination38 (both overt and tacit39) not only give rise to distinct forms of
inequality but they have also played an immense role in creating and
perpetuating economic inequality.40 The case for optimism is not impossible
to make, but there are numerous hurdles to clear.41
B. The Critical Role of Tax Laws
1. In General
Of the many intertwined and root causes of economic inequality, tax laws
and policies play a critically important role. As one commentator noted,
“Those at the top have managed to design a tax system in which they pay less
than their fair share—they pay a lower fraction of their income than do those
who are much poorer.”42 Worse yet, the relief afforded those at the top, as
was noted previously, is financed by gradually shifting the tax burden to those
lower down on the income scale. The TCJA represents the most recent phase
of this evolutionary degeneration in vertical taxpayer equity. Although an
exhaustive treatment of each change introduced in the TCJA is beyond the
scope of this article, a brief commentary tour facilitates a holistic view of the
legislation and thereby reveals its core intent. Given that many individuals
have most of their wealth concentrated in their principal residence(s) (which
accounts for some degree of wealth inequality), the changes influencing
homeownership merit closer examination. We will see that the changes with
respect to the treatment of qualified residence interest reflect Congress’s
broad-based approach to burden-shifting, ensuring that even the upper middle
months in jail, must pay a fine of $150,000, and must perform 150 hours of community service).
38. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 68–71 (noting that inequality arises not only from the operation
of government but also from social forces like discrimination).
39. See id. at 69 (noting the impact of implicit discrimination on perpetuating inequities and
pointing out that tacit collusive behavior can play a role in the economic suppression of another group).
40. See id. at 68–71.
41. See id. at 282 (noting that discrimination is one of the most invidious and hardest sources of
inequality to eradicate); Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 2, 6 (2016) (emphasizing that inequality falls more harshly on women and minorities
and pointing out that “[t]he Court’s benign view of the market and its biased view of women create a
potent combination that results in further entrenchment of economic inequality for women”).
42. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 38.
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class (rich in tax revenue potential) shares its portion of the pain.
2. Provisions Helpful to Wealthy Individuals
By far, the TCJA provision most helpful to wealthy individuals is the
lowering of progressive tax rates, continuing a concerted and persistent effort
started during the Reagan administration. At the same time, Congress altered
the alternative minimum tax rules (AMT), thereby ensuring that progressive
rate relief on the one hand would not be countered by AMT confiscation on
the other. Likewise, the increase in the allowance for charitable contributions
(in the form of cash) was balanced by a suspension in the phaseout or overall
limitation on itemized deductions. Your Average Joe does not itemize
deductions, and to be sure, he does not donate 60% of his adjusted gross
income to charity, in cash or otherwise.43 Although some believe that such
tax relief for the wealthy stimulates the economy and ultimately trickles down
to the benefit of middle- and low-income taxpayers, history confirms that such
supply-side measures ultimately fail to pan out.44
In fact, in the wake of progressive rate reductions in the 1980s, taxpayers
no longer facing extraordinary marginal rates took the opportunity to pursue
even higher salaries,45 retaining or appropriating for themselves funds that
could have been used to expand businesses, hire more workers, or (in some
instances), distribute earnings to shareholders. Dissuasive taxation (i.e., the
imposition of very high marginal rates) has been proposed as one means of
curbing such behavior.46
The TCJA also changed the rules regarding alimony.47 Under prior law,
43. See JOINT COMMITTEE ESTIMATES, supra note 15, at 36. Although the charitable contribution
deduction was estimated (in 2018) to be a $78 million tax expenditure for those in the $40,000–
$50,000 income class, the same deduction was estimated to be a tax expenditure of over $33.5 billion
for those in the $200,000 and Over income class. Id.
44. See PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 656 (concluding that substantial reduction in the top marginal
tax rates in the early 1980s did not stimulate productivity, at least not to any statistically measurable
extent).
45. See id. at 655 (noting that after 1980, executives sought substantial increases in compensation
as a result of markedly lower marginal tax rates).
46. See PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 659–61 (arguing that dissuasive taxation can curb skyrocketing
executive compensation demands without reducing productivity).
47. See Stephan Fishman, New Rule for Alimony Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, NOLO (last
visited Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/you-must-report-alimony-receivedincome-but-many-dont.html (detailing the impacts of the TCJA on alimony taxation); Martin M.
Shenkman, Divorce Post-TCJA: Unexpected Consequences, TAX ADVISER (Jan. 17, 2019),
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the individual paying alimony was entitled to a deduction with respect to
alimony paid, and the recipient was required to include such alimony in gross
income.48 For divorce and separation instruments executed after December
31, 2018, however, those paying alimony are no longer allowed to deduct such
alimony, and recipients are no longer required to include such alimony in
gross income.49 On its face, the new law draws a clear line of demarcation
and would, in general, appear to be balanced and fair. But the new law also
allows those whose divorce and separation instruments were executed on or
before December 31, 2018 to amend them such that the new law applies; this
provision, as law, has full force and effect but is not set forth in the Code.50
Many believe that the new provision will harm “new” alimony payers,51 and
it may do just that. But to the extent an alimony payer’s divorce or separation
instrument was executed on or before December 31, 2018, he or she may have
absolutely no reason to amend the agreement to apply new law and forego a
deduction. The law does, unfortunately, create a disturbing possibility.52 If
an alimony payer operating under the old rules has managed to reduce or
effectively eliminate his or her tax liabilities otherwise by employing
professional tax strategists, an alimony deduction is useless, but the recipient
(who may receive hundreds, thousands, or even millions53 of dollars in
alimony) can be relieved of 100% of any alimony-related taxes by mere

https://www.thetaxadviser.com/newsletters/2019/jan/divorce-post-tcja-consequences.html
(highlighting the elimination of deductible alimony payments).
48. See Fishman, supra note 47 (explaining how the prior system worked because those paying
alimony were typically in a higher tax bracket than those receiving, so each party was taxed
accordingly).
49. See Fishman, supra note 47 (highlighting the changes in alimony taxation per the TCJA);
Shenkman, supra note 47 (explaining that the TCJA amendment is permanent and applies to any
divorce or separation instrument executed after December 31, 2018 or one that was executed before
December 31, 2018 but is modified after that date).
50. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11051(c), 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
51. See CHH TAX LAW EDITORS, TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT: LAW, EXPLANATION & ANALYSIS
103 (Wolters Kluwer 2018).
52. See, e.g., Jim Tankersley, ‘Hurry Up and Get a Divorce’? For the Rich, There’s an Incentive,
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/us/politics/new-tax-law-richdivorce.html (discussing both the various ways to apply the new law and the option of getting a divorce
before the law takes effect).
53. Dr. Dre Estranged Wife Justifies $2 Mil Monthly Support, TMZ (Sept. 5, 2020),
https://www.tmz.com/2020/09/05/dr-dre-wife-nicole-young-justifies-two-million-dollar-monthlysupport-with-expenses/ (explaining that Nicole Young, the estranged wife of infamous rapper “Dr.
Dre” (Andre Romelle Young), hopes to receive $2 million per month as spousal support in connection
with the couple’s divorce).
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amendment of the divorce or separation instrument.54 For those amicably
divorced from billionaires (and obligated to include alimony in gross income
under the old rules), the ability to escape taxes legally is huge.55 Assuming
pre-nuptial contracts are not dispositive, single billionaires hoping to get
married can promise tax-free alimony, married billionaires facing divorce can
use tax ramifications as a bargaining chip in divorce proceedings, and
billionaires divorced (pre-TCJA with no need of a deduction) have a new
carrot to wave in front of whomever they pay includible alimony to. It’s a
billionaire’s paradise.
3. Provisions Beneficial to Businesses and Business Owners
In an apparent effort to make it easier and more profitable to do business
in the United States, the TCJA lowered the corporate tax rate from 35% to
21%.56 The immediate effect, however, was not prompt investment in
domestic enterprises to save American jobs.57 Rather, corporations often used
the additional funds to buy back stock and thereby pump up short-term
earnings per share.58 With an objective increase in that metric, corporate
executives across the board could then petition for performance-related
bonuses and thereby reap personal financial benefits. Ensuring that no
54. See Tankersley, supra note 52 (noting several options spouses may choose instead of alimony
payments, such as real estate and retirement accounts); Should You Modify Your Decree? Impact of
Tax Law Changes on Alimony, YHB (Jan. 11, 2018), https://yhbcpa.com/tax-consulting/modifydecree-impact-tax-law-changes-alimony/ (noting that modifying a divorce agreement could be
beneficial to the taxpayer if the income levels of the alimony payer or recipient change).
55. See Heather L. Locus, Minimizing Taxes in Divorce Without the Alimony Deduction, FORBES
(July 12, 2019, 8:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/heatherlocus/2019/07/12/minimizing-taxesin-divorce-without-the-alimony-deduction/?sh=40101788344b (arguing the change in alimony tax
treatment may not always be beneficial to the recipient); Tankersley, supra note 52 (“Because they
have more, the folks in the higher brackets have more of the ability, not to circumvent the law, but use
the law accordingly.”).
56. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13001(a), 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
57. See Richard Phillips, The Immediate Economic Impact of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Could Be
Even Less Than Expected, INST. OF TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y (July 11, 2018), https://itep.org/theimmediate-economic-impact-of-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-could-be-even-less-than-expected/
(estimating that 43% of the increase in real GDP will go to foreign investors instead of Americans).
58. See Anne Marie Knott, Why the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) Led to Buybacks Rather Than
Investment, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2019, 4:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/annemarieknott/
2019/02/21/why-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-tcja-led-to-buybacks-rather-than-investment/?sh=17b39
e1137fb (“The underlying logic for the TCJA was that allowing companies to keep a greater share of
profits[] would stimulate investments in long term growth. Instead, the dominant company response
to the TCJA was stock buybacks.”).
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business was left behind, Congress also created the deduction for qualified
business income, such that non-corporate taxpayers could deduct 20% of the
income passed through to them from their business.59 Greasing the wheels of
commerce further, Congress allowed the immediate expensing of up to $1
million of otherwise capitalizable business expenditures,60 removed the
twenty-year cap on the use of net operating losses,61 and preserved the ability
to deduct business meals (while generally eliminating the allowance for
business-related entertainment expenses).62
4. Shifting the Burden to Other Taxpayers
a. In General
Congress’s embarrassingly favorable treatment of wealthy individuals
and businesses in the TCJA is more than well-matched in its treatment of other
taxpayers. At first glance, the suspension of all miscellaneous itemized
deductions might appear to be fairly harmless. After all, to the extent
taxpayers itemize at all, most have little if anything in the way of
unreimbursed employee expenses or similar items, so losing the ability to
deduct even a scaled-down amount is no loss at all. Likewise, if hobbyists are
no longer able to offset hobby income with hobby losses, they can forego the
activity or simply enjoy the psychic, non-tax benefits of their activity.63 No
59. See generally I.R.C. § 199A(a)(2) (2018) (explaining the requirements for the potential 20%
reduction).
60. New Rules and Limitations for Depreciation and Expensing Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,
IRS (Apr. 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/new-rules-and-limitations-for-depreciation-andexpensing-under-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act (describing the new maximum deduction of $1 million, up
from $500,000).
61. CARES Act Impact on Net Operating Losses: Frequently Asked Questions, BDO (Apr. 2020),
https://www.bdo.com/insights/tax/federal-tax/cares-act-impacts-on-net-operating-losses-frequent
(“The 2017 tax reform legislation known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 . . . lifted the previous
20-year limit on [net operating loss] carryforwards . . . .”).
62. See I.R.C. § 274(a) (2017) (prohibiting deductions for business-related entertainment
expenses). But see Diana Fitzpatrick, IRS Clarifies 50% Business Meal Deduction Under TCJA,
Nolo,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-updates/irs-clarifies-50-business-meal-deduction-under-tcja.
html (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) (explaining that the TCJA did not alter the ability to deduct businessrelated meals).
63. See I.R.C. § 183(a) (2018) (“In the case of an activity engaged in by an individual or an S
corporation, if such activity is not engaged in for profit, no deduction attributable to such activity shall
be allowed under this chapter except as provided in this section.”); Steven Wright, Hobby Loss Law
Changes:
Loss
of
Miscellaneous
Deduction,
Intuit
Accts.
(Feb.
7,
2019),
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harm, no foul. What’s key is that in stripping taxpayers of deductions,
Congress was, indeed, aggressive.
For example, in addition to clarifying that non-military taxpayers are not
currently entitled to deduct moving expenses,64 Congress was sure to provide
that even if the employer covered moving expenses, the amount paid would
be includible in gross income as compensation,65 and would not constitute a
qualified moving expense reimbursement.66 In reducing the personal
exemption amount to zero, Congress took the historically significant step of
assaulting a family-friendly provision that has been a part of the tax law for
decades.67 Although ostensibly offset by increases in standard deduction
amounts and the child tax credit, decreasing the personal exemption amount
to zero ultimately lowers, at some point, what Congress would otherwise
allow as a tax benefit to large and growing families. Middle- and lowerincome families are, in effect, forced to finance tax cuts for the wealthy.68
Moreover, in light of differential birth rates, such an approach falls more
harshly on families of color69 and threatens to weaken the economy.70 Those
who used to enjoy handsome tax refunds may find that they are no longer
arriving.
Turning its attention to itemized deductions of real import and fiscal
impact, Congress capped the deduction for the payment of state and local
income and property taxes (SALT) at $10,000, thereby depriving many uppermiddle class taxpayers of a substantial portion of what they would otherwise
have been able to claim.71 One could certainly argue that lowering the SALT
https://proconnect.intuit.com/taxprocenter/tax-law-and-news/hobby-loss-law-changes-loss-ofmiscellaneous-deduction/ (discussing the changes and impact of the TCJA on hobbyists).
64. See I.R.C. § 217(a), (g), (k) (2018).
65. See I.R.C. § 82 (2018).
66. See I.R.C. § 132(a)(6), (g)(2) (2018).
67. I.R.C. § 151(d)(5) (2017).
68. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 239 (“[O]ur economic system has benefited those at the top, at
the expense of the rest, and [] this system is far removed from what has been called ‘the achievement
model of income determination,’ in which incomes reflect contributions to society.”).
69. Cf. BEVERLY D. TATUM, WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN THE
CAFETERIA? 2 (Basic Books 2017) (pointing out that the vast majority of the population growth in the
United States takes the form of growth in the non-White population as a result of differential birth
rates and immigration patterns).
70. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 243–44 (arguing that investment stimulus is a function of getting
money into the hands of those in the middle class and noting that measures effectively raising taxes
on the middle class will dampen demand).
71. I.R.C. § 164(b)(6)(B) (2017) (“[T]he aggregate amount of [state and local] taxes taken into
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deduction made sense from a vertical taxpayer equity perspective. After all,
the SALT deduction was estimated to be a $10.57 billion tax expenditure in
2018 for those in the $200,000 and Over income class and only a $123 million
tax expenditure for those in the $40,000–$50,000 income class.72 But at the
same time that Congress was capping the SALT deduction, it was increasing
the deduction cap for charitable cash contributions (which made up some
portion of the estimated $33.56 billion tax expenditure in 2018).73 Congress
decreased the deduction for taxes largely paid by working individuals while
increasing the deduction for money given away freely.74 The burden-shifting
could not be more explicit, and the SALT deduction was not the only victim.
b. Qualified Residence Interest—Acquisition Indebtedness
For many, achieving the American Dream includes owning a home, and
commentators have noted that the inability to achieve homeownership (and
rely on it to effect intergenerational wealth transfers) has contributed
significantly to existing levels of wealth inequality. The TCJA altered the
rules governing the deduction of qualified residence interest, and by doing so,
it altered the homeownership calculus. Many would argue that the change
was warranted and long overdue.75 But what exactly did the TCJA
accomplish? Let’s take a closer look.
Before enactment of the TCJA, taxpayers were generally able to deduct
the qualified residence interest paid on up to $1 million of acquisition
indebtedness (with respect to a principal residence and a second residence).
Many have noted that the deduction with respect to mortgage interest was not
made part of the tax law to encourage homeownership.76 Rather, the
deduction for mortgage interest simply existed alongside the deduction for all
forms of personal interest.77 When Congress eliminated the deduction for
account . . . for any taxable year shall not exceed $10,000 . . . .”).
72. See JOINT COMMITTEE ESTIMATES, supra note 15, at 36.
73. See id.
74. See id. (demonstrating this disparity in a side-by-side chart).
75. See e.g., ERIC TODER ET AL., REFORMING THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION, URBAN
INSTITUTE 1–2 (2010) (arguing that the pre-TCJA state of mortgage interest deduction was in need of
reform).
76. See, e.g., id. at 1 (“The [mortgage interest deduction] was not originally placed in income tax
law to subsidize home ownership.”).
77. See id. (noting that the mortgage interest deduction was not put in the Code to encourage
homeownership and that at the time, all personal interest was deductible); U.S. GOV’T
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personal interest in the Tax Reform Act, the mortgage interest deduction
managed to survive78 as a carveout; by definitional fiat, “qualified residence
interest” is not “personal interest.” As a tax expenditure, the allowance is
costly,79 and commentators have criticized the deduction for some time on
various grounds. In addition to arguing that the allowance fails to encourage

ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION: DESPITE CHALLENGES
PRESENTED BY COMPLEX TAX RULES, IRS COULD ENHANCE ENFORCEMENT AND GUIDANCE 3 (July
2009) [hereinafter USGAO] (noting that the mortgage interest deduction goes back to 1913 because it
was simply one of many forms of deductible interest).
78. See TODER ET AL., supra note 75, at 1 (noting that the Tax Reform Act eliminated the
deductibility of personal interest, but the mortgage interest deduction was left in place); see also Albus,
supra note 15, at 593 (noting that with the 1986 Act, qualified residence interest was still deductible,
but that if it was not acquisition indebtedness, interest deductibility would follow only if the money
was used for qualified medical or qualified educational expenses). Thus, before the Tax Reform Act,
all personal interest was deductible. See Christine Manolakas, Qualified Residence Interest
Deduction: A Win for Unmarried Co-Owners, 17 NEV. L.J. 199, 204 (2016) (explaining the two major
changes the Tax Reform Act of 1986 included). The Tax Reform Act rendered all personal interest
non-deductible, but carved out (by definition) qualified residence interest which was deductible within
limits. Id. (“A major exception to the general disallowance of a deduction for personal interest was
qualified home mortgage interest.”). In general, the interest on the debt was deductible to the extent
the debt did not exceed the lesser of (1) the fair market value of the residence(s) or (2) the sum of the
cost basis of the residence, qualified medical expenses, and qualified educational expenses. Id.
(discussing when a taxpayer could deduct personal interest). The interest on any debt in excess of the
relevant ceiling was not considered “qualified residence interest” and was presumably non-deductible.
See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND
REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 52–53 n.120 (Jan. 27, 2005) [hereinafter STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE OPTIONS]. The limits existing prior to the TCJA were put in place in 1987, and although
interest on home equity indebtedness was capped at $100,000, the funds could be used for any purpose.
See id. at 53.
79. See JOINT COMMITTEE ESTIMATES, supra note 15, at 39 (noting that the mortgage interest
deduction was estimated to be a $25 billion tax expenditure in 2018). Commentators have lamented
the cost of the mortgage interest deduction over time and encouraged reform. See Dickerson, supra
note 24, at 460 (noting that the mortgage interest deduction is one of the most significant federal tax
expenditures, and that it is largely useless to ordinary Americans who do not itemize their deductions);
Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1396 (2000) (concluding that the mortgage interest
deduction is “expensive, distributionally inequitable, and encourages [urban] sprawl”); Martin A.
Sullivan, The Rich Get 100 Times More Mortgage Subsidy Than the Poor, TAX ANALYSTS 1110–12
(Mar. 7, 2011) (indicating that those in Congress who oppose budget-conscious modification of
mortgage interest subsidies have little sincere interest in tax reform).
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homeownership80 and provides bad incentives,81 commentators have opined
that it provides an upside-down subsidy for the wealthy,82 is discriminatory,83
80. See TODER ET AL., supra note 75, at 3 (citing various studies comparing homeownership rates
in different countries (some with and some without a mortgage interest deduction) indicating that there
is no clear link between availability of the mortgage interest deduction and homeownership rates).
According to reported data (circa 1998), the United States had a homeownership rate of 65%. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 5: HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES FOR THE UNITED STATES (1998) (reporting the
homeownership rates from 1965 to 1998). At the same time, several countries had similar rates of
homeownership without a mortgage interest deduction (e.g., Australia had 70%, and Canada had
63%). See Mann, supra note 79, at 1385–86 n.235. Mann also points out that some economists believe
that elimination of the mortgage interest deduction would result in lower home prices. See id. at 1387.
She goes on to argue that a shelter tax credit would encourage all Americans to own homes. See id.
at 1393.
81. See Mann, supra note 79, at 1351 (arguing that although the mortgage interest deduction tends
to encourage the purchase of expensive homes, the mortgage interest deduction not only fails to
incentivize all Americans to own homes but also encourages urban sprawl); see also TODER ET AL.,
supra note 7518, at 2–3 (noting that allowing the deduction of interest on up to $1 million of
acquisition debt incentivizes the purchase of more expensive homes and encourages one to own the
most expensive home one can afford (or, as the case may be, cannot afford)).
82. See Mann, supra note 79, at 1360–62 (noting that those who benefit most from the mortgage
interest deduction do not need a subsidy, and pointing out that the mortgage interest deduction is an
upside-down subsidy because those who need a subsidy least enjoy its benefits most); see also TODER
ET AL., supra note 75, at 2–3 (emphasizing that those at the very top of the income distribution benefit
the most from the mortgage interest deduction); id. at 8, 10 (noting that eliminating the mortgage
interest deduction would have the most significant impact on those at the top of the income distribution
and, with respect to family type, married taxpayers with children); id. at 17 (“The distributional effects
largely reflect the fact that the mortgage interest deduction provides the largest benefit . . . for taxpayers
who itemize, face high marginal tax rates, and live in expensive homes.”); John J. Ammann & Jennifer
Hagner, The Double Standard in Housing Subsidies: Why Should Criminals Be Allowed to Take the
Mortgage Interest Deduction?, 16 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. 229, 231 (2007) (noting that
the richest taxpayers with more mortgage debt get bigger mortgage interest deductions); Julia
Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal
Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 408 (1994) (“The
allowance of a deduction for home mortgage interest has been criticized as being a subsidy directed at
middle-class and wealthy taxpayers and as being of little benefit to moderate- and low-income
homeowners. Despite this criticism, the home mortgage interest deduction is unlikely to be eliminated
due to its popularity and the perceived political risk of opposing it.”); William T. Mathias, Note,
Curtailing the Economic Distortions of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 MICH. J. L. REFORM 43,
61–62 (1996) (noting that at the time, those in the ninety-first percentile of the income distribution
enjoyed more than 50% of the tax savings from the mortgage interest deduction).
83. See Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 347–48
(2009) (arguing that low-income and Black taxpayers benefit less from the deduction for qualified
residence interest and that the latter likely enjoy less of the tax benefit derived from excluding gain on
the sale of a principal residence); Mann, supra note 79, at 1365 (noting that the mortgage interest
deduction discriminates against minorities who are more likely to have lower incomes and are less
likely to be homeowners); see also Sullivan, supra note 79, at 1011–12 (pointing out that those living
in “rich” cities or areas benefit far more from the mortgage interest deduction than those living in
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distorts the housing market,84 and is plagued with compliance issues.85 It
should also be noted, for the sake of adding wealth inequity insult to wealth
inequity injury, that a taxpayer’s “second residence” can be a “boat” (which
apparently includes a yacht), so long as it has toileting, sleeping, and cooking
facilities.86
Despite the mortgage interest deduction’s apparent shortcomings and
repeated calls for its replacement or reduction,87 the allowance has
considerable staying power. The TCJA left the mortgage interest deduction
in place, and even in its reduced state, it was still estimated to be a $25 billion
tax expenditure in 2018 (largely benefitting—by approximately $15 billion—
“poor” areas); TODER ET AL., supra note 75, at 13 (“Black and Hispanic taxpayers are much less likely
than [W]hites or Asians to benefit from the home mortgage deduction. On average, [B]lacks and
Hispanics have lower incomes, lower rates of homeownership, and lower house values than [W]hites.
Consequently, they are less likely to qualify for the home mortgage deduction, less likely to itemize,
and less likely to realize substantial tax savings. Asians are only slightly less likely than [W]hites to
benefit from the home mortgage deduction.”); Ammann & Hagner, supra note 82, at 229–30 (pointing
out that upper-class individuals committing crimes are not at risk of losing a housing subsidy (in the
form of a mortgage interest deduction), whereas those in public housing may lose their home and
housing subsidy in the wake of certain forms of criminal conduct).
84. See Mathias, supra note 82, at 56 (noting that the economic effects associated with the
mortgage interest deduction distort the housing market). Mathias later points out that a government
subsidy for homeownership disturbs optimally efficient market allocation of resources by having
investors over-invest in owner-occupied housing. See id. at 58.
85. See USGAO, supra note 77, at 13 (“Because the Form 1098 information report shows the
dollar amount of interest a taxpayer paid in a year without regard to the limits on the amount of debt
imposed by law, IRS’s computer matching program comparing Form 1098 and tax return amounts
will not detect certain noncompliance.”). Suggested revisions to enhance compliance have included
addition of the following: property address, balance information, refinancing indicators, and
designations identifying acquisition and home equity indebtedness. See id. at 14–15. Those in the
mortgage industry complain that those filing the forms may not be able to provide the relevant
information or would encounter substantial and costly difficulties in achieving compliance, especially
if loans have been resold or refinanced. See id. at 19. At least one IRS examiner has noted that it is
common to find taxpayers with three homes deducting the interest on all three while waiting to sell
one of the residences. See id. at 22.
86. See Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(p)(3)(ii) (2014).
87. See, e.g., Kristin McGovern Painter, Note, There’s No Place Like Home: Projections on the
Fate of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction and the Alternative Minimum Tax in Light of Consumer
Behavior, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 295, 306–07 (2007) (discussing President George W.
Bush’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, which proposed eliminating the home mortgage
interest deduction, replacing it with a “Home Credit,” and eliminating the interest deduction with
respect to mortgages on second homes and home equity indebtedness); see also Dickerson, supra note
24, at 460 (arguing that, however unlikely, the best way to generate revenue to address the problem of
housing affordability is to reduce or eliminate the deduction for mortgage interest); Mathias, supra
note 82, at 45 (arguing that the mortgage interest deduction should be eliminated or substantially
reduced).
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those in the $200,000 and Over income class).88 The TCJA accomplished,
more or less, what the Tax Reform Act accomplished.89 It grandfathered
existing acquisition indebtedness while chipping away at the basic allowance
going forward, reducing the acquisition indebtedness cap to $750,000 from
$1 million.90 Notwithstanding the fact that any tampering with the mortgage
interest deduction can prove disruptive and despite the fact that there is
approximately $9.78 trillion of mortgage debt outstanding (as of June 2020),91
Congress still felt obliged to reduce (on a going forward basis) the interest
deduction allowance for upper middle-class home buyers; even those
taxpayers were not spared the aggression of the revenue collector in financing
rate cuts and preserving favorable tax rates for the rich. To be sure, it may
appear that Congress was wholly justified in reducing this beleaguered,
upside-down subsidy, but bear in mind that the mortgage interest deduction
matters only to those who choose to (or must) borrow to finance a home
purchase. The rich need not borrow. But those taxpayers who do (even if
economically privileged) must shoulder more and more of the burden of
allowing, among other things, tax rates to remain low on long-term capital
gains and qualified dividend income, forms of income the rich care about a
great deal.
c.

Interest on Home Equity Indebtedness

Rather than trimming back the deduction with respect to interest on home
equity indebtedness, the TCJA eliminated it altogether, regardless of whether
the home equity debt is new or was previously outstanding.92 Under the law
as it existed immediately prior to the enactment of the TCJA, taxpayers could
deduct (to some extent at least) the interest on home equity indebtedness. The
principal amount limit was the lower of (1) $100,000 or (2) the fair market
value of the home reduced by the amount of acquisition indebtedness

88. See JOINT COMMITTEE ESTIMATES, supra note 13, at 36 tbl.3 (estimating 2018 expenditures).
89. USGAO, supra note 77, at 3 (noting that the $1 million limit only applies with respect to postOctober 13, 1987 debt and that interest on acquisition indebtedness incurred on or prior to that date is
deductible in full because of its “grandfathered” status).
90. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(F) (2018).
91. See CENTER FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA, QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND
CREDIT 2020: Q2, at i (2020) [hereinafter CENTER FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA].
92. I.R.C. § 163(3)(f)(i)(I) (2018) (excluding home equity indebtedness interest from the list of
allowable personal interest deductions).
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outstanding at the time the home equity indebtedness was incurred.93
Taxpayers were free to use the money obtained for any purpose.94 Not
surprisingly, commentators and analysts regularly called for the deduction’s
repeal,95 arguing that its availability allowed homeowner exploitation,96
93. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i) (providing the deductible calculation).
94. TODER ET AL., supra note 75, at 2 n.3 (“In practice, individuals often use the proceeds of home
equity loans to purchase cars and other durables, thereby making the costs of financing these items
effectively deductible to homeowners.”); see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OPTIONS, supra
note 78, at 53 (noting that the interest on valid home equity indebtedness is deductible and that funds
acquired can be used for any purpose). The Committee further noted the following:
The present-law deduction for interest on home equity indebtedness is inconsistent with
the goal of encouraging home ownership while limiting significant disincentives to saving.
A taxpayer may deduct interest on a loan of up to $100,000 secured by his residence that
has no relation to the acquisition or substantial improvement of the residence. This acts as
a disincentive to savings and is unrelated to the purpose of encouraging home ownership.
Further, the present-law home equity indebtedness rules provide inconsistent treatment by
allowing deductible interest for homeowners’ consumption spending that is not allowed to
similarly situated non-homeowners.
Id.
95. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OPTIONS, supra note 78, at 53 (proposing repeal of the
deduction for interest on home equity indebtedness); see also Forrester, supra note 82, at 378 (arguing
that although home equity indebtedness should be allowed, federal laws encouraging the incurring of
home equity indebtedness should be eliminated); id. at 379 (arguing for the elimination of the
deduction for interest on home equity indebtedness). Forrester also noted that the availability of the
interest deduction with respect to home equity indebtedness contributed to the dramatic increase in
total home equity indebtedness; from 1981 to 1991, total home equity indebtedness increased from
$60 billion to $357 billion. See id. at 378–79. Regarding then-salient equity considerations, Forrester
argued for the elimination of the interest deduction for home equity indebtedness because allowing
such a deduction offended horizontal equity norms, rewarded those who had equity in their homes,
and failed to make homeownership more accessible. See id. at 440–42.
96. See Forrester, supra note 82, at 375 (arguing that Congress has enacted measures which
encourage home equity indebtedness and thereby provide inappropriate incentives to various segments
of the mortgage industry); id. at 378 (pointing out that predatory lenders enjoy special privileges under
federal bankruptcy law and that they are able to victimize home equity debtors); id. at 388–89
(emphasizing that minorities and the elderly are frequently targeted by predatory home equity lenders);
id. at 378, 383 (noting that borrowers do not appreciate the risks, including foreclosure, associated
with home equity financing); Donna S. Harkness, Predatory Lending Prevention Project: Prescribing
a Cure for the Home Equity Loss Ailing the Elderly, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 1 (2000) (discussing
predatory home lending practices, particularly as they negatively impact the elderly); Jewell, supra
note 22, at 355 (discussing abusive practices in the home equity lending market); Gary Klein,
Preventing Home Equity Lending Fraud—Special Truth in Lending Protections Enacted, 7 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REP. 126, 126 (1995) (noting Congress’s passage (in 1994) of laws protecting
consumers from abusive home equity lending practices); id. (pointing out that predatory home equity
lenders tended to target the elderly, racial minorities, and the poor because such borrowers often could
not obtain credit through mainstream channels); id. at 127 (indicating that lenders often hoped to
foreclose on homes with substantial equity, purchase the home at foreclosure for less than its fair
market value, and later re-sell the home at fair market value (thereby capturing the prior homeowner’s
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operated as a loophole through personal interest deduction prohibitions,97
made underserved credit available,98 presented numerous compliance issues,99
and would not prove difficult to eliminate.100 Without question, the
commentators make a number of highly legitimate points. The deduction for
interest on home equity indebtedness did present a loophole allowing those
fortunate enough to incur such indebtedness to deduct amounts that would
likely constitute personal interest in the hands of others. But in its zeal to bar
such a deduction outright (and regardless of taxpayer reliance interests),
Congress may have cut far too close to the bone in some instances.
Taxpayers who need to borrow to finance various purchases often have
considerable wealth tied up in their homes, and some have relied on home
equity indebtedness to cover medical and educational expenses.101 The TCJA
could have carved out exceptions (subject to substantiation requirements)
making it possible to deduct interest on home equity indebtedness used for
specific purposes. And while leaving in place its cap on debt used to acquire
a personal residence, it could have preserved some allowance with respect to
equity as profit on the sale)).
97. See Klein, supra note 96, at 127 (noting that the changes introduced by the Tax Reform Act of
1986 made home equity lending attractive because the interest on such loans was deductible and
interest on most other forms of consumer debt had become non-deductible for federal income taxation
purposes); Forrester, supra note 82, at 411 (“Early versions of the [Tax Reform Act] in Congress
phased out deductibility of consumer interest but provided for deduction of interest on any loan
secured by a first or second residence. Lenders recognized this as a ‘loophole’ and, even before the
tax reform package was passed, began advertising home equity loans as a means for homeowners to
continue deducting interest paid on consumer loans despite the general non-deductibility of consumer
interest under the proposed measure.”).
98. See Forrester, supra note 82, at 383 (pointing out that the home equity option may allow a
debtor to obtain otherwise unavailable credit).
99. See USGAO, supra note 77, at 10 (noting that although home equity interest was not deductible
by taxpayers subject to the alternative minimum tax, some taxpayers would deduct it and tax
practitioners failed to detect the oversight); id. at 19 (“By comparing homeowners’ current mortgage
debt for a particular property with earlier debt, SMR Research estimated that up to several million
homeowners had loans that might have exceeded the home equity debt limitation. In the aggregate,
these homeowners’ debts over the debt limitation were several hundred billion dollars.”); see id. at 14
(highlighting the difficulty of identifying returns with a home equity interest compliance issue).
100. See Forrester, supra note 82, at 443 (pointing out that eliminating the deduction for home
equity interest would not present unduly onerous administrability burdens); see also STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE OPTIONS, supra note 78, at 54 (noting that repeal of the deductibility of interest on
home equity indebtedness would not alter homeownership incentives, because potential homeowners
are not likely to hinge the decision on the availability of this deduction).
101. See LINDA CAVANAUGH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME EQUITY LINES OF CREDIT—WHO
USES THIS SOURCE OF CREDIT? 1 tbl.1 (2007) (reporting 4% of homeowners used home equity loans
to cover medical or education expenses).
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home equity indebtedness used specifically to fix up or improve a recently
acquired home.102 As it currently stands, a loan denominated as a “home
equity loan” can qualify as acquisition indebtedness if it is used to
substantially improve a qualified residence of the taxpayer (i.e., qualifying
definitionally as “acquisition indebtedness”), but only if the total amount of
acquisition indebtedness is at or below $750,000.103 Again, the rich need not
concern themselves with the irritant of borrowing, but those who turn to home
equity to cover various expenses—and there is approximately $375 billion in
home equity lines of credit out there104—must bear some portion of the burden
of favorable tax rates for favored businesses and well-protected forms of
income.
III. ADDRESSING THE INEQUALITIES: SHORT-TERM MEASURES
Inasmuch as there is no single root cause for economic inequality, there
is no single solution. Even so, the most effective strategy for addressing the
problem should involve some combination of short-term and long-term
measures. In addition to enhancing vertical taxpayer equity by increasing
progressive tax rates on individuals,105 Congress should increase tax rates on
corporations,106 or at least ensure a tighter link between lower tax rates and
the generation of objectively-measurable positive societal externalities (e.g.,
domestic job growth and investments in job-generating capital projects). And
rather than give a blanket 20% deduction with respect to qualified business
income, Congress should eliminate the deduction altogether or tailor and
condition the extent of its availability on various factors (e.g., gross revenues,
102. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 936, HOME MORTGAGE
INTEREST DEDUCTION 9–10 (2020) (noting the home acquisition debt limit and distinguishing
substantial improvements, which qualify for deduction, from repairs, which do not qualify).
103. See id.
104. CENTER FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA, supra note 91, at i (indicating a balance of $375 billion
in home equity lines of credit as of June 30, 2020).
105. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 31 (pointing out that progressive tax policies can limit the extent
of inequality). Stiglitz further notes that increasing tax rates will not prove harmful to small
businesses. See id. at 224 (characterizing as myth the argument that raising taxes on millionaires and
corporations will hurt small businesses and lead to job losses).
106. See id. at 278 (pointing out that an across-the-board tax cut for corporations is inferior as an
investment incentive relative to cutting taxes for firms that create jobs and invest in America). Stiglitz
also notes that at least one form of rent-seeking takes the form of corporations seeking the enactment
of laws that allow them to take advantage of others and pass costs along to others in society. See id.
at 39–40.
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individuals employed, measurable domestic investment, etc.). Congress
should also modify the mechanism by which it taxes long-term capital gains
and qualified dividend income. Even if Congress does not wholly abandon
the favorable treatment of these forms of income (or fully embrace the other
changes suggested), even small modifications will move us closer to
economic equity and slow the growth of the nation’s budget deficits.107
Congressional Budget Office estimates (2019–2028) indicate that raising the
ordinary income tax rate on the two highest brackets by 1% would generate
$123.4 billion in revenue,108 increasing the corporate income tax rate by 1%
would generate $96.3 billion,109 and raising the rate on long-term capital gains
and qualified dividends by 2% would generate $69.6 billion.110
IV. ADDRESSING THE INEQUALITIES: INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION
With the concerted effort of President Joe Biden and Democratic
leadership controlling both the Senate and the House of Representatives, we
may soon see the prompt repeal (or, perhaps, substantial modification) of a
number of the provisions in the TCJA. But Rome was not built in a day, and
one cannot cure economic inequality with short-term measures alone, no
matter how quickly implemented. Fortunately, inequalities in income and
wealth are not problems too big to solve. Wealth-building takes time, and
barring the inheritance of assets or the receipt of various inter vivos
intergenerational transfers, an individual usually builds wealth by saving or
possibly investing income received above and beyond that needed to cover
daily living essentials. The well-hewn path to financial prosperity starts with
higher education. In addition to putting the individual on firm financial
footing and thereby laying the foundation for wealth-building, the broader
higher education experience provides valuable social harmonization benefits.

107. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 214–15 (reasoning that reductions in the deficit could be
achieved by, inter alia, raising taxes on the wealthiest taxpayers, eliminating the favored treatment of
income earned primarily by the wealthy, and eliminating corporate subsidies).
108. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE DEFICIT: 2019–2028 at 207
(2018).
109. See id. at 266.
110. See id. at 207.
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A. The Tangible Value of Higher Education
According to Ben Bernanke, “the best way to improve economic
opportunity and reduce inequality is to increase the educational attainment
and skills of American workers.”111 Commentators have long emphasized the
importance of higher education not only as a means of attaining lifetime
financial security,112 but also as an important contributor to general health, life
expectancy,113 civic engagement,114 and other benefits.115 Equally significant
111. See Cody Branham, Note, Stuck in the Middle: Curbing Income Inequality with the Better
Bargain Plan, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 188 (2016) (quoting Ben Bernanke); see also STIGLITZ,
supra note 1, at 275 (pointing out that increasing inequality of opportunity is rooted, to some extent,
in changes with respect to educational opportunity); id. at 19 (“[E]ducation is one of the keys to
success; at the top, the country gives its elite an education that is comparable to the best in the world.
But the average American gets just an average education . . . .”).
112. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 31 (noting the importance of education to enhanced productivity
and high wages); id. at 75 (emphasizing how poorly those with only a high school education or less
have fared in the marketplace); Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, Address Before a
Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 25, 2011) (“Many people watching tonight
can probably remember a time when finding a good job meant showing up at a nearby factory or a
business downtown. You didn’t always need a degree, and your competition was pretty much limited
to your neighbors. If you worked hard, chances are you’d have a job for life, with a decent paycheck
and good benefits and the occasional promotion. Maybe you’d even have the pride of seeing your
kids work at the same company. That world has changed. And for many, the change has been
painful.”); Dickerson, supra note 24, at 452 (“In the 1960s, it was possible for a family to maintain a
middle-class life-style even if neither parent had a college degree. . . . A bachelor’s degree from a
four-year college has now become almost essential for people who aspire to be in the middle class and
it is virtually impossible for a worker to have reasonably predictable and stable lifetime earnings
without at least a bachelor’s degree.”); id. (pointing out that some lower-skilled jobs (for which a high
school diploma would previously have been sufficient) now require a college degree); Gilman, supra
note 28, at 420 (discussing the importance of “education as a springboard to financial security” and a
class equalizer); Amy J. Oliver, Improving the Tax Code to Provide Meaningful and Effective Tax
Incentives for Higher Education, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 93 (2000) (noting that a college
degree has “replaced the high school diploma” as the preferred job credential); Andrew D. Pike, No
Wealthy Parent Left Behind: An Analysis of Tax Subsidies for Higher Education, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
1229, 1230 (2007) (“Commentators assert that higher education provides low-income children with
the greatest opportunity for economic advancement.”); Branham, supra note 111, at 194 (“Graduating
from a four-year institution enables a student to earn about $1 million more over a lifetime.”) (citation
omitted).
113. See STIGLITZ, supra note 29, at xiii (preface) (“Educational attainment, which is often tied in
with income and race, is a large and growing predictor of life span.”).
114. See Gilman, supra note 28, at 432.
115. See Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 532–33
(2013) (pointing out the various economic benefits typically flowing from obtaining higher education,
including increased wages and reduced risk of unemployment); see also Vincent G. Kalafat, Note,
Rethinking Treasury Regulations § 1.162-5 and Slaying the Monster in the Education Tax Maze, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1985, 1988 (2005) (“With the potential to break down socioeconomic and racial
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is the fact that higher education provides numerous macro-economic
benefits,116 including enhanced economic efficiency (supporting overall
growth),117 reduction in labor force polarization118 (between the “elites” and
the “non-elites” we hear so much about),119 and a general reduction in
inequality.120 Ben Bernanke’s statement seems to champion higher education
largely as a means of facilitating the attainment of economic benefits (thereby
barriers, to fulfill individual dreams, and to unleash waves of innovation even greater than those of the
last century, higher education clearly provides lasting benefits both to individuals and society.”).
116. Kerry A. Ryan, Access Assured: Restoring Progressivity in the Tax and Spending Programs
for Higher Education, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (“By expanding college enrollment across
the income spectrum, the government facilitates realization of the positive externalities associated with
an educated citizenry by society as a whole.”); see also Oliver, supra note 112, at 97–98 (pointing out
that both the individual and society benefit from the investment in human capital made by those
seeking out and securing higher education and emphasizing that as a result, tax law should incorporate
incentives associated with higher education); Pike, supra note 112, at 1230 (noting the belief of
economists that “higher education produces positive externalities”); Kimberly J. Robinson,
Restructuring the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s Approach to Equity, 103 MINN. L. REV.
915, 922–23 (2018) (discussing racial and socioeconomic gaps in the educational context and
emphasizing that “[l]ongstanding opportunity and achievement gaps along lines of race, national
origin, and class harm our national interests in an educated democracy, a robust economy, and a just
society.”) (citation omitted); Simkovic, supra note 115, at 532 (noting that rationales for public support
of education generally point to the positive societal externalities flowing from education (both
economic and value-based)); Ruth Lynch Buchwalter, Note, Should 1 + 1 = 2? Does the Structure of
Federal Income Tax Expenditures for Higher Education Disadvantage Women and Low-Income
Individuals?, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 77, 92–93 (2000) (noting that both the individual and society
benefit from education).
117. See STIGLITZ, supra note 29, at xxii (preface) (“But if a country doesn’t give a large proportion
of the population the education that they need to earn a decent living, if employers don’t pay workers
a decent wage, if a society provides so little opportunity that many people become alienated and
demotivated, then that society and its economy won’t work well.”).
118. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 9 (“The polarization of the labor force has meant that while
more of the money is going to the top, more of the people are going toward the bottom.” (citation
omitted)); see also Dickerson, supra note 24, at 443 (pointing out how various technological
developments have reduced the need and availability for low-skill but high-wage jobs that previously
existed); id. (noting the recent sluggishness of wage increases in middle-income jobs, except jobs in
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics).
119. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 9 (noting the polarization of the labor force between the highly
skilled (very well-paid) and the low-skilled (not well paid)); id. at 53 (positively correlating the
availability of education and the supply of skilled labor).
120. See id. at 5 (highlighting the marked decrease in inequality between the 1950s and the 1970s
and crediting government policies related to education access via the G.I. Bill and the enactment of
highly progressive tax rates during World War II); Ryan, supra note 116, at 10 (“[A]dvanced
educational attainment may be one means to reduce income inequality and poverty.”); Simkovic, supra
note 115, at 532 (noting that “[v]alues-based rationales in the United States often cite the role of public
investment in education in reducing inequality or providing socioeconomic mobility.” (citation
omitted)).
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addressing financial inequality), but much in the way of inequality is rooted
in societal factors (like discrimination)121 that have contributed heavily to the
existence of income and wealth inequality. Unless these societal factors are
checked, or at least made part of the dialogue concerning inequality, such
factors promise to silently nourish its perpetuation. The good news is that the
higher education experience can play a critical role here as well.
B. Tearing Down the Berlin Walls of the Mind
Many students arriving at college have never had the opportunity to spend
an extended amount of time around those who are different in terms of class,122
race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, or gender identity. Without
the benefit of exposure to those who are different, prejudices and fears will
persist;123 thus, the enduring benefit of affirmative action programs, especially
those that are race-based.124 Indeed, writing for the majority in Grutter v.
Bollinger,125 Justice O’Connor emphasized the role of diversity in breaking
121. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 282.
122. See Robinson, supra note 116, at 938 (noting that “[c]hildren from different socioeconomic
statuses and races too often live in separate and unequal worlds”) (citation omitted); see also TATUM,
supra note 69, at 4 (noting that segregation in housing along race and class lines portends segregation
in secondary education); id. at 3 (noting that in most regions of the country, public schools are more
racially segregated than they were in the 1980s); id. at 8 (noting that Whites are least likely to live in
a racially diverse neighborhood and thus least likely to encounter non-Whites).
123. See Ashlee Richman, The End of Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Twenty-Five Years
in the Making?, 4 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 61, 75 (2010) (referring to a study conducted at New York
University and Harvard which indicated that racial prejudices are rooted in fear and that exposure to
people of other races can break down the predisposition to fear); id. at 63 (highlighting the merits of a
diverse student population, including the exposure to “people who think and feel differently” on
various issues, the enrichment of class discussion, and the preparation for a diverse working
environment); Chris C. Goodman et al., A Teacher Who Looks Like Me, 27 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 105,
106 (2013) (highlighting the engagement benefits of diversity, as distinct from mere student
characteristics or numbers); id. at 123 (“Meaningful contact must include opportunities to experience
diversity both inside and outside of the classroom, but availability of opportunity for contact is a
necessary first step.”); Brandon Paradise, Racially Transcendent Diversity, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
415, 420 (2012) (citing Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke in which he emphasized the need for
diversity as a means of exposing students to the ideas and mores of others).
124. See Gilman, supra note 28, at 433 (pointing out that a class-based approach to affirmative
action might challenge racial diversity efforts at the college level because poor Whites outnumber poor
Blacks and tend to have higher test scores while also noting that well-crafted plans may increase racial
and socioeconomic diversity); see also Richman, supra note 123, at 85 (expressing pessimism as to
the effectiveness of admissions programs that are not race-conscious but still are directed at achieving
diversity).
125. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
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down racial and ethnic stereotypes and in developing a diverse and racially
integrated leadership class.126 Over time, the U.S. Supreme Court has
generally proven supportive of affirmative action programs, but in recent
years, there have been numerous challenges and defeats.127 Such setbacks
have prompted one commentator to conclude that the Court’s distaste for racebased affirmative action effectively preserves existing inequalities (by
disregarding the long history of discrimination that produced such stark
inequity) and embraces the current resource allocation as a baseline from
which to address equal protection issues.128 He proceeds to argue that the
Court’s stance constitutionalizes racial inequality and does so, ostensibly, to
promote equality.129
Although college diversification initiatives continue to bear fruit,
challenges have managed to persist. Some students in that environment, for
example, will self-segregate,130 whatever their identifying characteristic, and
there is the persistent risk that diversity initiatives will have an excessively
narrow and limited focus.131 Aside from these concerns, one commentator
casts doubt on the value of diversity exposure after the earliest formative
years. He reasons that attempting to break down stereotypes and advance
social harmonization is best achieved much earlier in life132 and that

126. See id. at 330.
127. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275–76 (2003) (striking down, as not sufficiently
narrowly-tailored, the affirmative action program in use at the college level at the University of
Michigan).
128. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 HOWARD L.J. 611, 635–36 (2007).
129. See id. at 636.
130. See TATUM, supra note 69, at 1 (noting that in many high schools and colleges, some degree
of racial segregation is present in cafeterias); Richman, supra note 123, at 63–64 (noting the existence
of self-segregation on campus and the negative influence it has on the proliferation of diverse ideas);
id. at 78 (lamenting the existence of self-segregation the author experienced and noting that such
activity impeded the opportunity to enjoy a diversely enriched educational experience).
131. See Goodman, supra note 123, at 108 (“In order to reap the greater rewards of diversity in
higher education, that diversity must not be concentrated in one group, such as students or faculty.
Instead, diversity must permeate the institution from the students to the staff to the faculty.”); id. at
118 (noting the likelihood that implicit biases may develop further (and diversification efforts may be
handicapped) without a critical mass of diversity in various educational environments).
132. See Paradise, supra note 123, at 418–19 (arguing that correcting the “deficit in cross-racial
mutual understanding and empathy” is best achieved via exposing citizens to racial and other
differences in their formative (i.e., K-12) years); id. at 471 (arguing that early and sustained exposure
to difference is key in cultivating cross-racial and cross-religio-racial cooperation and identifying the
integration of primary and secondary schools as the most obvious opportunity for implementing the
needed exposure).
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attempting to achieve those goals at the college stage may be too late.133 Such
a reality will certainly be the case for some, especially given confirmation
biases, but it would be unwise to generalize. Both longstanding and recent
affirmative action cases, such as Grutter, clearly challenge the notion that
post-secondary exposure to diversity is ineffective.134 Objective realities have
a way of nailing the eyes wide open. One could also argue that with extensive
racial segregation in housing and constitutional barriers to integration at the
K-12 level, the lived, residential college experience135 is perhaps the last best
hope for achieving and sustaining racially transcendent diversity136 in society
at large or at least in a segment of the population. Higher education produces
leaders, and it is critical that our leaders in business, industry, and education
have broad exposure to difference. It is critical that they be given the
opportunity to challenge their implicit biases and, brick by brick, tear down
the Berlin Walls of their minds before assuming positions of power and
influence. Such is especially the case in a country as diverse as the United
States.
V. THE URGENT NEED TO FIX EDUCATION
Although attaining higher education confers a host of economic and noneconomic benefits, it is impossible to ignore the fact that education in the
United States is broken. Attending that fact is the reality that educational
deficits at all levels have contributed to the existence of inequality and, until
133. See id. at 473 (expressing doubt that exposure to diversity at the stage of life in which one
undertakes higher education can significantly alter an individual’s character); id. (arguing that
exposure to diversity in a higher education setting, while beneficial, “will, in many cases, perhaps
most, prove insufficient to uproot outlooks and mindsets that have taken hold over the course of a
young adult’s childhood and adolescence”).
134. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (deferring to the Law School’s
educational judgment that “diversity is essential to its educational mission” and that diversity will
produce educational benefits). The college and graduate school experiences also offer the opportunity
to study and explore diversity in greater depth in an academic setting. See Richman, supra note 123,
at 82 (noting the benefits of courses addressing diversity-related topics in fostering understanding and
interaction).
135. See Richman, supra note 123, at 81–82 (discussing research finding that diversity is likely to
be most impactful when students live with those from other racial groups).
136. See Paradise, supra note 123, at 417 (emphasizing that racially transcendent diversity focuses
on the achievement of unity while candidly acknowledging racial differences); id. at 418 (“Thus,
racially transcendent diversity, unlike post-racialism, does not claim that we are beyond race but
challenges us all to cooperate in the interest of our shared future and to avoid being bogged down in
the racial division of the past.”).
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effectively addressed, will play a key role in its perpetuation. Systemic
problems manifest at every stage of the educational experience.
A. The Need to Adequately Support Schools
As a preliminary matter, one problem with higher education is that some
students never make it to the university front gate. The resources dedicated
to individual educational systems at the pre-college level can vary
significantly.137 Rather than accepting the notion that financing disparities are
an unfortunate development, some argue that such inequities are a matter of
systemic design138 and political power.139 One commentator noted the
following: “[P]ublic education is brutally efficient at denying meaningful
educational opportunities to children who are growing up in poverty. With
relentless effectiveness, it shortchanges such children in everything from the
amount of funding their schools receive, to the qualifications of their teachers,
to the rigor of their daily assignments.”140
Disparities appear between states,141 within states,142 and within various
137. See Susan L. DeJarnatt, The Myth of School Choice: Reflections on the Two-Income Trap, 4
RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 94, 115 (2006) (stating that “[d]iscrepancies in tax bases among districts
lead to enormous disparities in resources available for schools”).
138. See Ross Wiener, Opportunity Gaps: The Injustice Underneath Achievement Gaps in Our
Public Schools, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2007) (arguing that despite knowledge that povertystricken students need more educational assistance, such students receive far less than what they need,
apparently as a function of public education systemic design); see also Gilman, supra note 28, at 432
(drawing attention to the problem of unequal school financing); Robinson, supra note 116, at 916
(emphasizing that the Every Student Succeeds Act “greatly reduced federal involvement in education,”
leaving considerable control to state and local governments); id. at 916–17 (lamenting that state and
local government control of public education portends grave consequences for poor and minority
students because such governments have consistently neglected the educational needs of those student
populations).
139. See John Dayton, Rural Children, Rural Schools, and Public School Funding Litigation: A
Real Problem in Search of a Real Solution, 82 NEB. L. REV. 99, 101 (2003) (“The interests of those
with political power are advanced through legislation, often at the expense of those without political
power. Because the advocates for rural children and schools generally lack both the financial and
political power to rival the influence of the more affluent suburban regions, rural schools are often put
at a disadvantage by school funding legislation.”).
140. Wiener, supra note 138, at 1317 (citation omitted).
141. See id. at 1319 (noting that the funding formulas in Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act operate, in effect, to provide more funding to wealthier states, notwithstanding its stated
goal of providing more resources to disadvantaged students).
142. See id. at 1319–21 (emphasizing unequal funding between states, between districts within
states, and within districts, resulting in states, districts, and schools with more poor students receiving
less funding).
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districts in a given state,143 resulting in a school system that regularly
reinforces the wide range of inequities existing outside school.144 And those
disparities invariably find glaring reflection in learning resources,145 basic
facilities,146 and (perhaps most tragically) in teacher quality. Even if (as has
been argued) funding disparities have narrowed in recent years, there remains
the need to devote considerable attention to teacher quality,147 and in doing
so, we should employ an holistic approach.148 As an initial matter, we need
to make secondary school teaching more attractive as a profession by
augmenting teacher pay149 and ensuring that teachers have a suitable working
environment.150 Moreover, given the extraordinarily important roles teachers
play in achieving learning outcomes,151 students across the board should enjoy
access to teachers of high quality,152 and ongoing attention should be devoted

143. See id. at 1321–22 (focusing on intra-district disparities with respect to teacher talent and
teacher salaries).
144. See id. at 1336 (noting that the allocation of resources in public education context “reflect and
reinforce inequality outside of school”).
145. See id. at 1324 (reasoning that high-poverty schools with lower teacher salary budgets should
receive additional funding for student support resources such as tutoring and professional development
rather than having such funds subsidize teacher salaries at schools in more affluent areas).
146. See TATUM, supra note 69, at 4 (pointing out that in schools with high concentrations of
poverty and racial segregation, lower teacher quality and higher turnover are likely (as are poorer
facilities)).
147. See Derek W. Black, Taking Teacher Quality Seriously, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1602
(2016) (arguing that although school finance litigation has closed or alleviated funding disparities,
enhancing the education that students receive requires considerable focus on teacher quality).
148. See id. at 1604 (pointing out the need for an holistic approach to improving teacher quality).
149. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 57 (arguing that better pay might have attracted and retained
better teachers (thereby improving long-term economic prosperity for the nation as a whole)).
150. See Black, supra note 147, at 1615–17 (emphasizing the importance of competitive teacher
salaries while noting that working conditions play a significant, and often predominant, role in terms
of retaining teachers); id. at 1605 (“Evidence shows that, at the very least, attracting more talented
teachers requires that teacher salaries be competitive with job opportunities outside of teaching and
that the environment within which teachers work improve.” (citations omitted)).
151. See Black, supra note 147, at 1604 (noting the importance of teacher quality to learning
outcomes and concluding that states have failed to address the teacher quality problem adequately);
Wiener, supra note 138, at 1327 (correlating teacher quality with college readiness in high-poverty,
high-minority schools); Lisa Darling-Hammond, Access to Quality Teaching: An Analysis of
Inequality in California’s Public Schools, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2003) (“National
studies have also found that differences in teachers’ qualifications—including teachers’ general
ability, knowledge of subject matter, preparation for teaching, and certification status, which reflects
aspects of all of these other indicators—show significant effects on student achievement measured at
the state, district, school, and individual student levels.” (citation omitted)).
152. See Wiener, supra note 138, at 1328 (pointing out that students in high-poverty schools are
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to providing teachers with sufficient resources and to monitoring instructor
readiness153 and performance.154 Students of modest financial means remain
capable of high academic achievement, and effective, experienced teachers
can usually elicit that level of performance.155
B. Accessing and Affording Higher Education
Under ideal circumstances, everyone with sufficient scholastic aptitude
would have access to an enriching college experience, but that is not the world
we live in.156 The sobering truth is that “[t]he fact that tax cuts for the rich
have increased the deficit and the national debt substantially has another
effect: it has created pressure to reduce government support for investments
in education, technology, and infrastructure.”157 One commentator reasons
that “[a] lot of the growing inequality relates to America’s inability to educate
so many of its young people.”158 The past is disheartening and the forecast
for the future is not encouraging. Education needs fixing, and it’s not going
to be outpatient surgery.
At a time when more education is needed,159 dropout rates are soaring,
likely to have less experienced teachers who are covering subjects outside their expertise and reasoning
that such teaching quality proxies “reveal extreme inequality in access to quality teachers”).
153. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 151, at 1046 (noting the importance of teaching skill and
knowledge and lamenting the fact that tens of thousands of teachers in California lacked full
preparation and credentialing, many working on waivers).
154. See Black, supra note 147, at 1606 (reasoning that the removal of ineffective teachers needs to
be a realistic possibility).
155. See Wiener, supra note 138, at 1325 (“Research unequivocally documents that the classroom
teacher is the single biggest determinant of how much students learn and that poor students can achieve
at high levels when taught by high-quality teachers.” (citation omitted)); id. at 1332 (“There is
evidence in schools all over the country of students who are growing up poor . . . and yet are learning
at the highest levels because their schools are working for them . . . . [W]hat we do in public education
absolutely can change the life chances of students from low-income families.”).
156. See Alanna Bjorklund-Young, Family Income and the College Completion Gap, JOHN
HOPKINS INST. FOR EDUC. POL’Y (2016), https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/
1774.2/63021/familyincomeandcollegegapmastheadfinal.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (stating that
in a recent study, 58% of high school sophomores from low socioeconomic status backgrounds
expected to graduate from college and only 25% actually did so, while 87% of students from high
socioeconomic backgrounds expected to graduate from college and 66% did so).
157. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 115. Stiglitz notes the possibility of borrowing to invest in the
nation’s future by “ensuring quality education for poor and middle-class Americans,” among other
things. See id. at 217.
158. Wiener, supra note 138, at 1318.
159. See Obama, supra note 112 (discussing the fact that new jobs will require post-secondary
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and that reality portends more polarizing income and wealth inequality.160
Education, ordinarily, could be relied on as an instrument of social mobility,161
but the status quo in the United States appears to be one in which the education
level of one’s parents well predicts the education likely to be received by a
given individual.162 Thus, the current educational system works not to alter
but to reproduce the current societal order163 in a perpetual cycle. Most
college students at highly selective colleges come from the top income
quartiles,164 and that reality enhances the gravity of the following observation:
At selective institutions of higher education, admissions decisions
have a special political impact: rationing access to societal influence
and power, and training leaders for public office and public life.
Those admitted as students then graduate to become citizens who
shape business, education, the arts, and the law for the next
generation.165
Thus, differential access to education not only constitutes another form of
inequality,166 but it also can serve as a mechanism by which those who control
education and that such education must be within the grasp of every individual).
160. See Cheryl George, Non-Education in America: Gateway to Subsistence Living, 14 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 243, 243 (2008) (“Dropout rates are the proverbial canary-in-the-coal-mine. If
ever there was a predictor of poverty, discrimination, abuse, neglect, inability to parent—in short the
suffering of an entire generation—it is the lack of experience and education we are affording our
minority students.”).
161. See Strand, supra note 26, at 285 (pointing out that education, which enhances opportunity,
generally acts to break down the rigidity of extant societal hierarchies).
162. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that relative to other comparable countries, a child’s
education in the United States is more heavily influenced by parental educational attainment); id. at
94 (linking the ability to access good education to the income, wealth, and education of one’s parents);
Gilman, supra note 28, at 421–22 (highlighting the fact that wealthy families have the ability to invest
in educational resources such as tutors, enrichment programs, private schools, and college).
163. See Gilman, supra note 28, at 420 (noting that the current educational system perpetuates an
achievement gap between wealthy and poor students (who are disproportionately racial minorities));
Strand, supra note 26, at 291; id. at 288–289 (discussing the relative lack of social mobility in the
United States in terms of intergenerational elasticities, which generally measure the likelihood that a
child’s socioeconomic status will track that of his parents); Wiener, supra note 138, at 1318 (noting
that there is less social mobility in America, even relative to other industrialized countries).
164. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 19 (pointing out that most of the students in highly selective
colleges (74%) come from the top quarter of the population).
165. Lani Guinier, Admission Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic
Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 115 (2003) (citations omitted).
166. See Rahman, supra note 1, at 2450 (arguing that differential access to public goods such as
“healthcare, education, water, and housing” is a “troubling and pernicious form of inequality”
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access to education can perpetuate inequality.167 To its credit, Congress has
historically taken steps to support the efforts of a wide range of students to
access higher education. The Talent Search and Upward Bound programs, for
example, aim to facilitate entry to college and post-baccalaureate programs by
various students, including those who are from low-income families,168 those
who will be first-generation college students, and those who are disabled.169
Those programs can legitimately claim some degree of success,170 and yet,
these programs have endured attempts to defund or eliminate them,171 often
by tactics that can accurately be described as silly.172 Aside from programs
requiring direct funding, Congress has made an effort to enhance access to
higher education via tax-favored incentives, but such measures generally
benefit those with some degree of discretionary income.173 Programs like
(emphasis added)).
167. See id. at 2450 (noting that those who control access to public goods can construct systematic
forms of inequality and exclusion); id. at 2450–51 (“[E]quitable and inclusionary governance of these
goods and services is critical to dismantling these structural inequalities and promoting a more
inclusive and equitable social and economic order.”).
168. See Placido G. Gomez, et al., Don’t Crimp the Pipe, or Dam the River, at the Law School
Door, 27 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 71, 90–91 (2013) (quoting B. Miller who noted that although the
Upward Bound program she attended was 98% Black, the program she later worked with at the
University of Iowa “had more White students than Black, Hispanic or Asian. . . . Many of these federal
programs . . . had changed their focus from helping minorities to helping lower socio-economic
students.”).
169. See id. at 75.
170. See id. at 79 (referencing a study which indicated that Upward Bound participants were likely
to enter and complete college).
171. See Kelly Field, The Ups and Downs of Upward Bound, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 18,
2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-ups-and-downs-of-upward-bound/ (discussing repeated
attempts to reduce funding for or eliminate the Upward Bound program, among others).
172. See id. (noting the Education Department’s refusal to consider over seventy Upward Bound
grant applications because they failed to follow, among other things, formatting guidelines such as
line spacing and font size). One commentator noted the following:
For the want of double spacing in a small section of a 65-page grant application, 109 lowincome high-school students will be cut off from a program at Wittenberg University that
has been providing them with tutoring and counseling to prepare them for college. And
they’re not alone. Over the past few weeks at least 40 colleges and organizations with
similar Upward Bound programs have also had their grant applications summarily rejected
by the U.S. Department of Education for running afoul of rules on mandatory doublespacing[], use of the wrong font, or other minor technical glitches.
Goldie Blumenstyk, Dozens of Colleges’ Upward Bound Applications Are Denied for Failing to Dot
Every I, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.chronicle.
com/article/dozens-of-colleges-upward-bound-applications-are-denied-for-failing-to-dot-every-i/.
173. See Phyllis C. Smith, The Elusive Cap and Gown: The Impact of Tax Policy on Access to
Higher Education for Low-Income Individuals and Families, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y
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Section 529 plans, for example, offer tax benefits to those with the ability to
set aside funds for future educational use.174 The more one is able to set aside,
the greater the benefit. Accordingly, “[t]he greatest benefits accrue to those
who can afford to front-load their contributions and to those in the highest tax
brackets.”175 Those in the lowest income quartiles have difficulty saving for
any purpose.176 Even those who are able to take advantage of such educational
incentives may find that they have failed to keep pace with the skyrocketing
cost of college.177 One commentator noted the following:
Over the last three decades, the cost of attendance at colleges and
universities increased at rates well in excess of the economy-wide
rate of inflation. . . . Moreover, in recent years, colleges and
universities have allocated more of their financial aid budgets
towards “merit” scholarships with a smaller percentage of grants
awarded on the basis of financial need. As a result, these costs make
it difficult, if not impossible, for lower-income students to attend
four-year institutions, even when they are academically qualified to

181, 210 (2008) (“The current design of the tax education incentives offers the greatest benefit to
affluent individuals, while the working poor would likely receive no benefit.”).
174. Id. at 216–17 (explaining that a wealthy individual could contribute a large sum of money,
allow it to grow tax free, and then use it to pay for a private school education without being subject to
income tax).
175. Pike, supra note 112, at 1254. Pike goes on to emphasize that “empirical data suggest that
middle-income and upper-middle-income taxpayers enjoy most of the benefits from the education tax
credits. Low-income families receive little, if any, benefit.” Id. at 1255–56; see also DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 970, TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUC. 85–86 (2019)
[hereinafter TREASURY—EDUCATION] (indicating that several education-related tax benefits allow
exclusions or provide for tax credits which are generally non-refundable and subject to caps and
phaseouts).
176. See Eric A. Lustig, Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans and the 1997 Tax Provisions—Middle
Class Panacea or Placebo? Continuing Problems and Variations on a Theme, 31 AKRON L. REV.
229, 233, 236 (1997) (noting that the middle class, in particular, has a poor history with respect to
savings generally). State prepaid tuition plans arose at least in part because families had difficulty
saving for college and tuition costs were rising. See id. at 239–40.
177. See Branham, supra note 111, at 195 (noting extraordinary increases in college-level tuition
over recent decades); id. at 188 (noting that the cost of college and the burden of student debt have
contributed to current income inequality); id. at 213 (noting the low likelihood that enhancing the
affordability of higher education can eliminate income inequality but pointing out that enhancing
educational access may curb income inequality); Dickerson, supra note 24, at 453 (noting both the
dramatic rise in the cost of college and, given the drain of financial aid resources and grants, the
increase in student debt burdens).
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do so.178
Although Pell Grants have traditionally helped to soften the financial
burden of attending college,179 such funding is under attack.180 More and
more, with rare and limited exception,181 financial aid for students has taken
the form of loans,182 giving rise to the specter of default.183 It also bears noting
that most student loans are federal loans,184 and such debt is a moneymaker
for the government.185
178. Pike, supra note 112, at 1230.
179. See Branham, supra note 111, at 197 (linking the increase in income equality with increased
levels of students qualifying for federal Pell Grants); Cynthia E. Garabedian, Note, Tax Breaks for
Higher Education: Tax Policy or Tax Pandering?, 18 VA. TAX REV. 217, 238 (1998) (arguing that
increased Pell Grants would be more effective at encouraging low-income families to send their
children to college).
180. A congressional report indicated the following:
[The last Congress] recklessly expanded Pell [G]rants for higher education beyond
government’s means to pay, exacerbating an existing trend of spending-driven tuition
inflation and endangering the viability of the program for the truly needy. The President’s
budget recognizes that Pell spending is on an unsustainable path and recommends a few
reforms to start to get control of the program’s costs.
HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 112TH CONG., THE PATH TO PROSPERITY: RESTORING AMERICA’S
PROMISE 42–43 (2011); see also Branham, supra note 111, at 197 (concluding that decreases in Pell
Grant funding, combined with tuition increases and reduced state funding, will force individual
families to incur increased higher education costs).
181. See Smith, supra note 173, at 219–20 (indicating that Harvard University and Yale University
have programs which essentially make a college education available to low-income individuals free
of charge).
182. See id. at 185 (“The primary sources [that] historically have been available to provide funding
for low-income individuals going to college were grants, scholarships, and other sources of state
and/or federal financial aid. By 1981, student loans became the primary source of financial aid for
students across the income spectrum.”); see also META BROWN ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
STAFF REPORT NO. 668, MEASURING STUDENT DEBT AND ITS PERFORMANCE 4 (2014) (“In 2010,
student debt surpassed credit cards to become the second largest form of household debt after
mortgages whereas prior to 2008, the student debt was the smallest of household debts.”); Branham,
supra note 111, at 199 (discussing the increase in the number of students receiving loans as well as
the average loan balance); Garabedian, supra note 179, at 219 (pointing out Congress’s
acknowledgement (in connection with enacting § 221) that students incur substantial debt while
obtaining graduate and undergraduate education).
183. See Smith, supra note 173, at 204 (pointing out that “as a result of the substantial amount of
loans incurred by low-income borrowers, defaults have become a significant problem for the federal
government and borrowers”).
184. See Simkovic, supra note 115, at 560 (noting that the “overwhelming majority of the U.S.
student loan market consists of federal government loans” (citation omitted)).
185. See id. at 561 (noting that “the federal direct loan program is still a moneymaker for the federal
government”).
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C. Surviving College and Thriving Thereafter
Of those students who clear the various hurdles encountered in gaining
entry to college, a substantial percentage manage to succeed while there.186
Graduation from college often leads to a first job and from there to the
building of both a healthy professional, financial, and personal future. Or at
least it used to. Students employ a host of hard-earned skills to navigate
college successfully,187 but after the heady glee of commencement, many find
they face a challenging job market. Some opt to attend graduate school
(possibly incurring additional debt).188 Others may become part of the socalled “gig” economy189 which promises precious little, if anything, in terms
of employment and economic stability. And yet another distinct subset of
recent graduates becomes part of the so-called “boomerang generation,”
returning home after college to live with parents because they cannot afford
to live independently.190 Income and job insecurity191 ultimately result in the
delayed formation of independent households by millennials, resulting in
historically low homeownership rates.192 And the pressure to defer
homeownership is not only exacerbated by the suffocating burden of student
debt,193 but the mere existence of substantial student debt may complicate or
even doom an aspiring homeowner’s mortgage underwriting process.
186. See Undergraduate Retention and Graduation Rates, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (last
updated Apr. 2020), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_ctr.asp (stating that about 62% of
students who began working toward their bachelor’s degree at a four-year institution in 2012 graduated
from that same institution within six years).
187. See Strand, supra note 26, at 292 (highlighting the fact that graduating from college requires
various forms of support (from an early age and continuing through high school) as well as the
development and harnessing of specific personal skills and habits).
188. See STIGLITZ, supra note 29, at x (preface) (noting that for college graduates facing a tough
job market, going to graduate school is the only viable option and pointing out that those not from an
affluent background find that they may have to incur more debt in order to attend).
189. See Dickerson, supra note 24, at 437 (noting that workers in the “gig” economy have erratic
employment and income patterns, making it difficult to save money towards a down payment on a
home).
190. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 15; see also Dickerson, supra note 24, at 436 (noting that rather
than starting their own households, millennials are delaying marriage and reproduction and returning
home to live with parents).
191. See Dickerson, supra note 24, at 436 (pointing out that millennial income and job insecurity
(along with lifestyle choices) have contributed to delayed household formation by millennials).
192. See id. at 436 (noting that homeownership rates in 2015 were at their lowest in almost fifty
years).
193. See id. at 441 (“[S]tagnant wages and student loan debt makes it much harder for young college
graduates to buy homes or even find affordable rental housing.”).
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Several years ago, outstanding student debt totaled more than outstanding
car loan and credit card debt combined.194 As of the close of the second
quarter of 2020, student debt had reached over $1.5 trillion.195 Viewed on a
more individualized basis, the numbers take on greater clarity. In commenting
on the situation faced by recent law school graduates, one state bar association
noted the following: “The average student graduates from law school today
with over $100,000 of law school debt. After adding accrued interest,
undergraduate debt, and bar study loans, the debt burden of new attorneys
frequently increases to $150,000 to $200,000, levels of debt that impose a
crushing burden on new lawyers.”196 Even if a student is fortunate enough to
secure meaningful employment (after college or graduate school), he faces
years of repayment197 extending beyond his 20s, to his 30s and 40s and, quite
possibly, into his 50s.198 Should he encounter severe financial difficulty,199 a
bankruptcy filing may not result in relief.200 But even if things proceed
smoothly, the burden of the repayment of debt principal and the regular
accrual of interest thereon ensures an extended term of indenture, likely from
ten to thirty years or more.201 If we are to win the war on income and wealth
inequality (and Congress shows no inclination towards enhancing direct
educational grants), then facilitating the servicing of student debt should be
part of a long-term strategy.
Congress has already made manifest its intent to alleviate the burden of
educational debt by allowing a deduction for student loan interest.202 Indeed,
during the period in which deductions with respect to student loan interest
were disallowed altogether (while deductions for some forms of qualified
residence interest were permitted), members of Congress expressed their
194. See Branham, supra note 111, at 200 (“At the end of 2014, total student loan debt surpassed
$1.3 trillion, more than both car loans and credit card debt in America.” (citations omitted)).
195. See CENTER FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA, supra note 91 (indicating that outstanding student
loan debt stood at $1.56 trillion as of the close of the second quarter in 2020).
196. ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT, FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE IMPACT OF
LAW SCHOOL DEBT ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES 1 (2013).
197. See Branham, supra note 111, at 201 (noting that student loan debtors face years of repayment).
198. See CENTER FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA, supra note 91, at 21 (indicating that student loan
debt still constitutes some percentage of total debt held by those over age fifty).
199. See id. at 28 (indicating that those with student debt tend to transition to serious delinquency
(in arrears by more than ninety days) during their 30s and 40s).
200. See Branham, supra note 111, at 202 (pointing out the virtual impossibility of discharging
delinquent student loan debt in bankruptcy).
201. See Oliver, supra note 112, at 113.
202. See I.R.C. § 221 (2018).
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concern. One legislator commented as follows:
As one advocate of the deduction for interest on student loans phrased
it, “it seems to me that if we can allow the deductibility on a second
home at the beach, at a minimum we can allow for that investment in
a young person[’s] . . . education.” Similarly, Senator Price reiterated
his opinion, one he set forth ten years ago, that “if you can deduct the
interest on your home mortgage or even on a second home at the
beach you surely ought to be able to deduct interest on something as
basic as a student loan.”203
Notwithstanding the existence of a basic allowance, commentators have
argued that the $2,500 ceiling is too low204 and that the deduction (which is
phased out rapidly)205 targets specific voter-rich segments of the population.206
There have been various proposals concerning the deductibility of student
loan interest.207 One proposal coordinated “home equity indebtedness” and
“qualified educational indebtedness.”208 Other proposals have even suggested
an unlimited deduction with respect to student loan interest (i.e., without
phaseout or dollar caps).209 What’s key and critical is that the TCJA, while
appearing somewhat responsive to normative arguments regarding qualified
residence interest, left the student loan interest deduction more or less
unaltered.
Given the gradual shift away from direct grants and towards student loans,
Congress could have taken the opportunity to provide some relief via the tax
expenditure route. Rather than keeping the interest deduction low and
retaining rapid phaseouts, Congress could have supported education by
allowing the deduction of student loan interest in full.210 Alternatively, given
203. Albus, supra note 15, at 603 n.102 (citations omitted).
204. See Oliver, supra note 112, at 142 (arguing that the interest deduction ceiling of $2,500 is too
low).
205. See I.R.C. § 221(b) (2018).
206. See Lustig, supra note 176, at 270 (pointing out that the phase-out of the student loan interest
deduction at certain income levels allows the benefit of the deduction to be targeted to the voter-rich
middle class).
207. See Albus, supra note 15, at 603–05.
208. See id. at 604 & n.107.
209. See id. at 604–05 nn.104–115.
210. See id. at 615 (arguing, ultimately, that the phase-out levels be increased because current
phaseout levels will exclude those who borrow large sums to secure education at the graduate and
professional school level).

988

[Vol. 48: 949, 2021]

Intent, Inequality, and the Berlin Walls of the Mind
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

that many students with considerable student debt will not take on or qualify
for a mortgage, Congress could allow student loan debtors to deduct (within
caps) either qualified residence interest, student loan interest, or any
combination of the two with an aggregate limit (e.g., interest on $500,000 of
acquisition indebtedness and $250,000 of student loan debt—or any
combination up to $750,000 of total loan principal).
One could rationally counter that removing the low ceiling or the rapid
phaseout with respect to the student loan interest deduction would, in some
instances at least, simply constitute another tax expenditure largely enjoyed
by the wealthy (i.e., those with high marginal tax rates).211 But there’s an
important difference, for example, between a new surgeon who incurred no
student debt (benefitting from a series of intergenerational wealth transfers)
and a new surgeon who, in attempting to pull herself up by the bootstraps,
incurred massive amounts of student debt along the way. Thus, such a tax
expenditure would target its benefits not merely to those with high marginal
tax rates but those who invested heavily in achieving professional success.212
Moreover, there is arguably a tighter link (relative to someone who may
simply save money in the wake of a progressive tax rate cut) between the
granting of tax relief in this context and the generation of positive societal
externalities by the beneficiaries. Heavily indebted doctors respond to the
health needs of the community. Indeed, many of those fighting on the front
lines in response to the COVID-19 crisis had to borrow money to get there.
And while, like some physicians, there are certainly attorneys who focus
largely on advancing their own financial interests, there are heavily indebted
attorneys who serve society as prosecutors, public defenders, and advocates
for children, immigrants, and the elderly.
Failing to alleviate the student loan interest burden shouldered by students
frustrates their ability to thrive and secures their place among those who must
continue to shoulder the burden of financing rate cuts for rich individuals,
corporations, and the like. Congressional miserliness in this regard not only
stifles the nation’s ability to achieve a competent and competitive work

211. See id. at 612–13 (concluding that the rules allowing the deduction of student loan interest
achieve vertical equity by affording relief to taxpayers with lower incomes but fail to achieve
horizontal equity because not everyone paying interest on student loans is able to take the deduction).
212. See id. at 613–14 (acknowledging that those who borrow to secure graduate and professional
education may end up with higher incomes as a result but reasoning that such students are no less
deserving of the interest deduction, especially given their debt load).
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force213 but also adds insult to the substantial opportunity costs endured by
those borrowing to obtain college and graduate education. In addition to
repaying loan principal and regularly accruing interest, students lose some
degree of earning capacity while attending school (handicapping wealthbuilding). Heavily indebted students also may enter the work force but find
themselves forced to delay or reduce contributions to retirement savings.214
Perhaps the greatest opportunity cost takes the form of delayed
homeownership and the collateral consequences flowing from that delay.
While paying rent (or remaining in a parent’s household), the heavily indebted
student is unable to benefit from a mortgage interest deduction, has no real
property tax deduction, and cannot borrow against any built-up equity in the
home to finance investments or expenses. Even saving for a down payment
on a home can prove difficult.215 Accordingly, delayed homeownership
ultimately translates to delayed wealth building, and delayed wealth building
results in reduced wealth building. Those in a position to benefit from
accumulated wealth can handily circumvent these opportunity costs.216 That
reality ensures the widening of the wealth gap.
Education in the United States needs considerable attention, and the effort
must be both conscious and national.217 In response to rising levels of
inequality (in light of various social, political, and economic perils), Brazil
implemented a massive increase in education expenditures and took steps to
reduce hunger and poverty in the 1990s, whereas the United States allowed
inequality and poverty to increase.218 Prevailing levels of inequality indicate
that little has changed in the intervening decades. The United States continues
213. See id. at 601 (emphasizing that the legislation allowing the deduction of student loan interest
was rooted in the desire to have a competent, educated, and competitive work force in the future).
214. See Branham, supra note 111, at 202 (reasoning that high levels of student debt result in
decreased entrepreneurship, delayed homeownership, and reduced retirement savings).
215. See Dickerson, supra note 24, at 448 (reasoning that millennials often have considerable
student loan debt burdens and, accordingly, have great difficulty saving money for a down payment
on a home).
216. See id. at 448 (“There is a strong link among savings, inheritances, and homeownership, and
young adults who inherit or can borrow money from friends or family to make a down payment on a
home typically become homeowners earlier than other renters.” (citation omitted)).
217. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 275 (“Opportunity is shaped, more than anything else, by access
to education, and the direction we have been going (income-segregated residential communities,
sharply decreased support for higher education—and the resulting sharp increase in tuition in public
colleges and restrictions on places available in engineering and other high-demand but high-cost
fields) can be reversed as well, but it will take a concerted national effort.”).
218. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 5.
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to stand in contrast with the rest of the developed world in that American
students, rather than enjoying substantial financial support from the
government and shouldering little financial cost, must finance higher
education and, accordingly, often graduate with substantial debt burdens.219
Those unfortunate enough to emerge with that debt face long repayment
periods, minimal, if any, tax expenditure relief, and no real hope of escaping
the debt in bankruptcy. The direct and opportunity costs associated with
obtaining increasingly critical higher education in the United States remain
exceedingly and unnecessarily high. Such costs nourish, and thereby
perpetuate, a host of systemic inequalities.
VI. CONCLUSION
Just a few short years ago, the American Dream was within the reach of
most Americans, but for many, that dream is now unattainable fantasy.220
Although well-entrenched societal norms and institutions have contributed
significantly to current levels of inequality,221 government policies have also
played a key role.222 Rationally, one can expect considerable resistance to
change by those intent on preserving their position of dominance and
privilege,223 but government policies and practices can evolve, and shifts in
tax policy are a necessary first start. Current tax law overtly reserves
preferential treatment for forms of income earned by the nation’s wealthiest
taxpayers and favored industries in which they operate. More covertly, it

219. See Simkovic, supra note 115, at 556–57.
220. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 274 (concluding that for many at the bottom and in the middle,
the American Dream has simply vanished). To the extent that the American Dream includes
homeownership, statistics are not improving for certain segments of the population. See CENTER FOR
MICROECONOMIC DATA, supra note 91 (reflecting notably fewer mortgage originations for those with
lower credit scores in the first quarter of 2020 relative to the originations during the first quarter of
prior years (e.g., 2003–2007)).
221. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 53 (pointing out that the social norms and social institutions
play a role in the level of inequality and emphasizing that the one percent shapes both the norms and
the institutions).
222. See id. at 5 (arguing that government policies have been critical to the creation of inequality in
the United States and reasoning that policy changes are needed to reverse the negative trend).
223. See id. at 77 (noting that “in the more unequal societies, government policies and other
institutions tend to foster the persistence of inequality”); id. at 161 (emphasizing that in the political
sphere, monied interest have ample incentives and resources to impede change because the current
system works in their favor).
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effects giveaways224 and provides subsidies,225 often while appearing
responsive to normative concerns presented in scholarly tax literature. The
TCJA brought about a number of undesirable changes in its quest to shift more
of the nation’s taxpaying burden from the rich to the upper, middle, and lower
classes. Corrective legislation can set the nation on a different path, and it is
my firm belief that a clear, concerted, and generous investment in the
education of the nation’s students will start the process of addressing a host
of inequalities226 and put the nation on the path towards greater societal
harmony and economic vitality.227 Viewed optimistically, the results of the
recent national-level elections were a referendum on the status quo, a national
moment of truth in which the electorate rejected the notion that prevailing
inequalities are an acceptable norm.
Left unchecked for far too long, the now-bionic invisible hand has
reproduced historic levels of income and wealth inequality and promises to do
so going forward both very rapidly and on a global scale. Beneficiaries of
inequity enjoy its fruits and can be counted on, with clear and specific intent,
to attempt to preserve the inequitable state of affairs. Although governments
have historically intervened to ensure an equitable distribution of goods and
to facilitate social mobility, they sometimes fail. In the United States,
unfortunately, Congress and the various federal courts228 have often appeared
to act as instruments to preserve inequity; the Citizens United v. FEC229
decision paved the way for aggressive corporate influence in the political
arena.230 Moreover, a number of state-level legislatures have taken aggressive
steps to handicap the ability of certain segments of the population to effect
socioeconomic and other changes via the ballot box.231 So our very political
224. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 42 (noting the in America, giveaways tend to be relatively
subtle).
225. See id. at 40 (identifying “subsidies hidden in the tax system” as rents from the public).
226. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 275 (“Public money should be used to expand support for state
and nonprofit higher educational systems and to provide scholarships to ensure that the poor have
access.”).
227. See id. at 281 (noting the need for heavy investment in education and technology to help
workers move from jobs lost to new jobs being created).
228. See Gilman, supra note 28, at 446 (noting the possibility that Supreme Court justices
subconsciously favor the wealthy).
229. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
230. See Gilman, supra note 28, at 437 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United v. FEC reinforced the primacy of corporate money in the political process, notwithstanding
congressional efforts to reform campaign finance laws).
231. Georgia Gov. Kemp Signs GOP Election Bill Amid an Outcry, CNBC, (Mar. 26, 2021, 5:41
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process is itself at risk.
Recent Republican administrations have played a key role in shifting the
nation’s taxpaying burden, and Republican incumbents have taken a number
of steps to remain in office both over time and in preparing for recent and
upcoming elections. The approach has many facets. In addition to appealing
to single-issue voters (e.g., anti-abortionists), they have capitalized on existing
inequalities by appealing to those who feel left behind (i.e., those lacking
college degrees)232 because they have lost earning power,233 even as they live
day-to-day with those who have considerable and growing economic power
(i.e., the detested, well-educated “elites”). Many of the so-called left behind
have been duped into thinking that Republican incumbents are advancing their
economic interests234 when, in fact, such policies exacerbate harm to those
individuals.235 Yet another tactic is to employ pejorative labeling and thereby
exploit knowledge gaps; some who now vehemently criticize “socialism” still
expect that Social Security and Medicare will be fully available to them as
they enter the retirement years. And perhaps the most sinister tactic employed
by some Republican incumbents has been to appeal to the nation’s Achilles
heel, ancient hatreds, prejudices, and stereotypes directed at people of color.
Difficult as these realities may be to digest, there remains room for cautious
optimism.
The base supporting Republican incumbents is weakening in the face of
COVID-19 and a host of new economic issues. At a time when class-based
unity at the ballot box is needed over the long term, it may come to fruition.
The changes introduced by the TCJA resulted in some taxpayers not receiving
the federal income tax refunds they had come to regularly expect. Worse yet,
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/26/georgia-gov-kemp-signs-gop-election-bill-amid-anoutcry.html (discussing a Republican-sponsored overhaul of Georgia elections in a move that some
believe will disproportionately harm voters of color and pointing out that election-related bills have
been introduced in many state legislatures since the November 2020 elections).
232. See TATUM, supra note 69, at 63 (discussing that fact that a Republican presidential nominee
appealed “to a non-college-educated, working-class base that was feeling left behind by globalism and
the loss of manufacturing jobs in the US”); see id. at 13 (discussing rising economic inequality and
anger and linking them to support of a Republican presidential nominee).
233. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 7 (“Young men (aged twenty-five to thirty-four) who are less
educated have an even harder time; those who have only graduated from high school have seen their
real incomes decline by more than a quarter in the last twenty-five years.” (citation omitted)).
234. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 137 (noting that those in the middle have been convinced that
their interests align with those advanced by the individuals and entities at the top).
235. See id. at 167 (noting that political conservatives have been able to persuade some Americans
to embrace policies that are not in their self-interest).
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some of those same taxpayers found themselves cutting, for the first time ever,
a check payable to the United States Treasury. If voters can manage to focus
consistently and resolutely on these harsh, bottom line, economic realities,
they can make rational, clear-headed decisions at the ballot box. The nation
that elected President Obama to two terms in office also delivered a popular
vote victory to Senator Hillary Clinton in 2016. Uniting once again, the nation
delivered victory to both President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala
Harris in November of 2020, and shortly thereafter, Democrats assumed
control of both chambers of Congress. As this article goes to press, President
Biden is already moving forward with his tax policy agenda (i.e., proposing
an increase in corporate tax rates, among other things, to facilitate funding of
a multi-faceted infrastructure initiative).236 And with Democrats controlling
both houses of Congress, he is well-positioned to advance a number of taxrelated measures which promise not only to generate considerable federal
revenue237 but also to enhance tax fairness. Alongside raising corporate tax
rates generally, such measures include raising the top federal income tax rate,
increasing the tax on long-term capital gains, taxing built-in capital gains upon
the taxpayer’s death, and augmenting the federal estate tax.238
At this historic juncture, we have the ability to address inequality and
move the nation forward with dispatch, even as we acknowledge that we have
hard work ahead in multiple arenas. Collective embrace of enduring
American ideals empowers us to seize this opportunity to win our best and
most promising future.

236. See FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 31, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-americanjobs-plan/.
237. See Gordon B. Mermin et al., An Updated Analysis of Former Vice President Biden’s Tax
Proposals, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/updatedanalysis-former-vice-president-bidens-tax-proposals/full (indicating that President Biden’s tax
proposals would increase federal tax revenue by approximately $2.1 trillion over the next decade).
238. See Tami Luhby & Katie Lobosco, Here’s How Biden Wants to Raise Taxes on the Wealthy
and Corporations, CNN (Mar. 18, 2021, 8:07 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/18/
politics/biden-tax-plan-explainer/index.html.
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